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LEGALIZING INTELLIGENCE
SHARING: A CONSENSUS
APPROACH
Brian Mund*
ABSTRACT

Governments face a decision between balancing collective national security interests
with individual privacy rights and strike that balance to different degrees. Only
recently has public attention turned to the lack of transparency surrounding crossborder international intelligence sharing agreements. Foreign intelligence cooperation is necessary for effective security, but differing intelligence governance
standards create tension between clashing privacy regimes. This Article proposes a
pragmatic pathway forward in the form of a palatable intelligence-sharing framework
that respects state sovereignty and security needs, while simultaneously establishing
revolutionary privacy protections. This first-of-its-kind framework identifies and
builds upon principles of international law to construct this practical framework.
These principles are: 1) principle of legality; 2) principle of safeguarding against
abuse; 3) principle of proportionality; 4) principle of transparency and oversight; 5)
principle of notification and remedies; 6) principle of complementarity; 7) principle of
good faith; and 8) an exigency exception.

*Brian Mund is a 2018 graduate of Yale Law School, where he received his Juris
Doctor, and a 2013 graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, from which he received
a Bachelor of Arts degree. He is grateful to Professor Michael Reisman and Asaf Lubin
as well as the 2018 Salzburg Cutler Global Seminar participants for their feedback on
previous drafts of this Article. All errors are the author's alone.
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INTRODUCTION

Suppose that Jane Doe shows up at our border with a
valid visa, but after that visa was issued ... her home
country learns that she is associated with a terrorist
organization but doesn't tell us.1
On April 25, 2018, United States Solicitor General, Noel Francisco,
defended President Donald Trump's third travel ban -which targets nationals
from Iran, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, North Korea, and Venezuela-before the
Supreme Court on the basis of inadequate information sharing. 2 Setting aside
the merits of this particular order, the case shines a light onto the
commonplace reality of cross-border information sharing. This snippet above
reflects the larger reality that in today's world, cross-border information
sharing plays a vital role in ensuring national security for many states. In
other words, governments keep their nations safe through exchanges of
intelligence data. 3
1

Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-

965).

Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Allows Trump Travel Ban To Take Effect, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/04/us/politics/trump-travel-ban-supremecourt.html. Chad has since been removed from the list countries. See also Trump 138 S.
Ct. at 2405 (2018) ("Invoking his authority under 8 U. S. C. §§1182(f) and 1185(a), the
President determined that certain entry restrictions were necessary to "prevent the
entry of those foreign nationals about whom the United States Government lacks
sufficient information").
3 What is data? Merriam-Webster provides the comprehensive definition that data
is "information in digital form that can be transmitted or processed." While data is a
plural noun, this Article follows the popular singular constructive use. See Data,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionaryI data (last visited
Mar. 8, 2019). Privacy interests arise in data that contains personally identifiable
information (PII), defined as "[a]ny representation of information that permits the
identity of an individual to whom the information applies to be reasonably inferred by
either direct or indirect means." See, e.g., Guidance on the Protection of Personal Identifiable
Information, U.S. DEP'T LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/ppii (last visited Mar. 7,
2019). While this definition of PII is fairly inclusive, Paul Schwartz and Daniel Solove
identify that "[a]t the same time, there is no uniform definition of PII in information
privacy law." Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy AndA New
Concept Of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1814 (2011).
2

3
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Currently, countries share intelligence information through bilateral
agreements. 4 Many of these agreements are secret and do not purport to be
binding under international law. 5 In recent years, multinational intelligence
exchange has continued to grow. 6 However, the public has only limited
information regarding the extent and details of cooperative intelligencesharing operations other than the fact that such cooperation exists. 7 For
example, the Five Eyes Signal Intelligence Alliance, made up of the United
States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand operates
according to the United Kingdom-United States Communication Intelligence
(UKUSA) Agreement, but the last publically available version is from 1955. 8
Taken together, these signs indicate that improvements in international
intelligence exchange since 9/11 have wrought "a qualitative change" in the
nature of intelligence cooperation. 9
4
HANS BORN ET AL., MAKING INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION
ACCOUNTABLE 62 (2015).

Id.
Id. at 64; see also Didier Bigo et al., National Security and Secret Evidence in Legislation
and Before the Courts: Exploring the Challenges, in EUR. PARL.: CL., JUSTICE & HOME AFF.
5

6

8 (2014) (describing "a growing transnational exchange of intelligence"); Szabo & Vissy
v. Hungary, App. No. 37138/14, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment, 'II 78 (2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=OOl-160020 (noting that governments' more and more
widespread practice of transferring and sharing amongst themselves intelligence
retrieved by virtue of secret surveillance."); S.C. Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (calling all
United Nations member states to "[e]xchange information in accordance with
international and domestic law and cooperate on administrative and judicial matters
to prevent the commission of terrorist acts.")
7
Craig Forcese, The Collateral Casualties of Collaboration: The Consequence for
Civil and Human Rights of Transnational Intelligence Sharing 6-11 (Mar. 5, 2009)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=
1354022 (explaining the difficulty to piece together the full scope and extent of
intelligence arrangements because these agreements are so closely guarded).
8 See Scarlet Kim et al., The "Backdoor Search Loophole" Isn't Our Only Problem: The
Dangers of Global Information Sharing, JUST SEC. (Nov. 28, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/47282/backdoor-search-loophole-isnt-problem-dangersglobal-information-sharing/; see also U.K.-U.S. Communications Intelligence
Agreement, U.S.-U.K., May 10, 1955, https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassifieddocuments/ukusa/ assets/files/new_ukusa_agree_1Omay55. pdf.
9 Richard J. Aldrich, Global Intelligence Co-operation versus Accountability: New Facets
to an Old Problem, 24 INTELLIGENCE & NAT'L SEC. 26, 30, 54 (2009).
4
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Intelligence sharing has also fallen under increased scrutiny by the
privacy rights advocacy community. In September 2017, Privacy International
spearheaded a campaign along with the Center for Democracy & Technology,
the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Electronic Privacy Information Center,
and the Open Technology Institute to "seek increased transparency for
intelligence sharing arrangements" from over forty governments. 10
Specifically, the Privacy International coalition has pressed for transparency
on intelligence sharing, and has also identified intelligence cooperation among
"the Nine-Eyes (the Five Eyes plus Denmark, France, the Netherlands and
Norway), the 14-Eyes (the Nine-Eyes plus Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain and
Sweden), and the 43-Eyes (the 14-Eyes plus the 2010 members of the
International Security Assistance Forces to Afghanistan)." 11 Other identified
multilateral intelligence sharing arrangements include EUROPOL between
the EU member states, the Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community between
European and African states, intelligence cooperation between eleven
countries in the Great Lakes Region, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan,

Letter from Gus Hosein et al., Exec. Director, Privacy Int'l, to Elizabeth B. Collins,
Board Member, Privacy & Civ. Liberties Board, Re: Oversight of intelligence sharing
between your government and foreign governments (Sep. 13, 2017),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4000688-US-Open-Letter-onIntelligence-Sharing-and.html; see also PRIVACY INT'L, EVIDENCE ON THE DATA
PROTECTION BILL AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS FOR THE HOUSE OF COMMONS PUBLIC BILL
COMMITTEE 6 (2018) (explaining that "[t]he Bill provides for almost unfettered powers
for cross-border transfers of personal data by intelligence agencies without appropriate
levels of protection.") https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmpublic/
dataprotection/memo/ dpb07. pdf.
10

Privacy International Launches International Campaign For Greater Transparency
Around Secretive Intelligence Sharing Activities Between Governments, PRIVACY INT'L (Oct.
11

23, 2017),
https ://www.privacyinternational.org/press-release/51/privacy-international-launches
-international-campaign-greater-transparency-around [hereinafter Privacy International]; see also Scarlet Kim et al., Newly Disclosed Documents on the Five Eyes Alliance
and What They Tell Us about Intelligence-Sharing Agreements, LAWFARE (Apr. 23, 2018),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/newly-disclosed-documents-five-eyes-alliance-andwhat-they-tell-us-about-intelligence-sharing (describing pressure for US disclosure of
secret intelligence agreements).
5
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and an anti-Islamic State intelligence sharing coalition of Russia, Iraq, Iran,
and Syria. 12
This Article responds to the demand for greater intelligence sharing
accountability by offering a detailed and thorough governmental intelligence
cooperation framework. This type of pragmatic, compromising approach is
sorely missing from a literature filled with idealistic yet wholly impractical
measures. With intelligence sharing propelled under the public spotlight with
renewed vigor in late 2017, the time is ripe for such an intervention. This
Article offers a pragmatic pathway forward for governments and activists in
the form of a palatable proposal that respects state sovereignty and security
needs while simultaneously establishing revolutionary privacy protections.
The Article further emphasizes the distinct tension that arises from
government intelligence sharing of personal information.

This tension

primarily arises when government intelligence agencies transfer information
related to national security threats: specifically, cross-border intelligence
transfers to combat serious crime and national security threats. 13 Government
intelligence transfers occur most frequently among allied countries, 14 but as
12 See Human Rights Implications of Intelligence Sharing, PRIVACY INT'L (Sept. 2017),
https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2017-11/PI-Briefing-toN ational-Intelligence-Oversight_0. pdf; Stephane Lefebvre, The Difficulties and
Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation, 16 INT'L J. INTELLIGENCE &
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 527, 529-534 (2003).
13
Privacy-security tradeoff considerations are also engaged during intergovernmental law enforcement data sharing and involve information transfers to one
another for the exchange of evidence and information in criminal and related matters.
These transfers usually occur through the formalized process outlined within a Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT). See generally 2012 International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Mar. 7, 2012) https://www.state.gov/
j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2012/vol2/184110.htm (detailing United States' use of MLATs). A
considerable literature has been emerging over the appropriate process for MLAT
reform. See infra note 186. While MLAT reform poses an important step to strengthen
the international data sharing regime, law enforcement sharing, and intelligence
sharing are most appropriately addressed separately for reasons addressed infra, notes
211-286.
14 See, e.g., Data Protection Bill, 20 Mar. 2018, Parl Deb HL (2018) col. 161 (UK),
https ://hansard. parliament. uk/Commons/2018-03-20I debates/c72d5ec6-a472-4c53be4c-8c80f291 bd2f/DataProtectionBill(Lords )(FifthSitting) (quoting Victoria Atkins in
saying that "[i]n the vast majority of cases, intelligence sharing takes place with

6
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the Trump v. Hawaii oral argument transcript suggests, not exclusively. 15 These
transfers directly engage profound questions with respect to the proper
relationship between actions taken in the name of national security and
ensuring appropriate privacy protections for the dissemination of private
information. Intelligence sharing between foreign intelligence agencies
provides tangible national security benefits. However, such benefits must be
balanced against the costs to privacy and open expression.
The world of intelligence sharing is understandably opaque. Hans Born,
Ian Leigh, and Aidan Wills provide a useful taxonomy for conceptualizing
international intelligence cooperation, and this paper adopts their thoughtful
framework. 16 Born et al. identifies five types of international intelligence
cooperation: 1) information sharing, 2) covert operational cooperation, 3)
hosting facilities and equipment, 4) training and capacity building, and 5)
providing software and equipment. 17 This paper focuses on the first type:
information sharing. Information sharing includes strategic information,
operational information, and tactical information.

Strategic information

includes policy analyses related to foreign policy developments or larger
security trends. 18
Operational information generally involves threat
assessments of groups' or actors' current capabilities, and unlike policyoriented strategic analyses, tends to be directed at security personnel. Finally,
tactical information relates to the specifics relevant for current operations the specific details necessary for answering the "who, what, where, when, and
how." 19
Shared intelligence information splits into two further subcategories:
"raw intelligence" or an analyzed "end product." 20 Raw intelligence has not
been altered from its initial collection form, whereas the "end product" has

countries with which the intelligence services have long-standing and well-established
relationships.").
15 See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018)
(No. 17-965).
16 BORN ET AL., supra note 4.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
zo Id.
7
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already received initial treatment by intelligence operatives. The sensitivity
of the collection source will impact the likelihood of raw data sharing, as will
the relationship between the two agencies. Lastly, the process of information
sharing can manifest in two distinct forms. Most often, information sharing is
"reactive," and results from ad hoc requests from a foreign partner for any
information on a given subject. 21 However, close allies may also share
information on an automated basis." 22 These arrangements may rely on joint
/1

databases or other shared receptacles of gathered intelligence information.

I.

EXISTENCE OF PRIVACYSECURITY TRADEOFF

Throughout the world, people care deeply about their privacy. Common-law
courts have long recognized the importance of privacy from governmental
intrusion. This long-standing common law principle announces, "the house
of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defense against
injury and violence as for his repose." 23 As expounded by American courts,
the privacy right allows one "to retreat into his own home and there be free
from unreasonable governmental intrusion." 24 For European countries,
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights grants "[e]veryone ..
. the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence." 25 Many other countries also protect the privacy of its
citizens. For example, Articles 23-25 of the Russian Constitution grant

Id.
Id.
23 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 71 (1905).
24 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United States,
365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)
25 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter "European Convention on Human
Rights"]. European Courts have also explicitly held that that private life "includes
personal identity, such as a person's name, and that the protection of personal data is
of fundamental importance to a person's enjoyment of his right to respect for private
life." Case C-92/09, Volker und Markus Schecke GbR v. Land Hessen, 2010 E.C.R. I11063,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/ document.jsf?text=&docid=80291 &pagelndex=
O&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1680697.
21

22

8
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substantial privacy rights, including the protection against "the collection,
keeping, use and dissemination of information about the private life of a
person." 26 Article 40 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China
notes that "freedom and privacy of correspondence of citizens of the People's
Republic of China are protected by law." 27 In August 2017, the Indian
Supreme Court overturned its precedent and unanimously declared, "The
right to privacy is protected as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal
liberty under Article 21 and as a part of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III of
the Constitution." 28 Notwithstanding this background of general respect for
privacy rights, government security practices threaten to intrude upon
citizens' rights.
However, the very purpose of privacy rights continues to be a source of
debate among various countries. The debate over the contours and purpose
of privacy rights does not map along a simple East-West or North-South
divide; for example, scholars have recognized "two western cultures of
privacy" 29 with fundamentally different approaches to privacy and
surveillance. 30 Recent scholarship has also recognized that China's unique
cultural and historical foundation of privacy have generated a wholly

RUSSIAN CONST., art. 23-25, http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-03.htm.
CHINESE CONST., March 14, 2004, art. 40, http://www.hkhrm.org.hk/english/law/
const03.html.
28 Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. v. Union Of India & Ors., (2017) Writ
Petition (Civ.), No. 494 of 2012, http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/supremecourt/
2012/35071/35071_2012_Judgement_24-Aug-2017.pdf.
29
See generally James Whitman, The Two Western Culture of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L. J. 1151 (2004).
30
See David Cole & Federico Fabbrini, Bridging the Transatlantic Divide? The United
States, the European Union, and the Protection of Privacy Across Borders, 14 INT'L J. CONST.
L. 220, 237 (2016). For an informative survey of 13 countries' surveillance and data
privacy laws, see generally Peter Swire & DeBrae Kennedy-Mayo, How Both The Eu And
26

27

The U.S. Are "Stricter" Than Each Other For The Privacy Of Government Requests For
Information, 66 EMORY L. J. 617 (2017) http://law.emory.edu/elj/content/volume66/issue-3/articles/both-eu-us-stricter-privacy-requests-information.html;
Ira
S.
Rubinstein et al., Systematic Government Access to Personal Data: A Comparative Analysis,
4 INT'L DATA PRIVACY L. 96 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ipu004.
9
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different conception of privacy. 31 These fundamentally different views of
privacy have prevented the formation of any internationally accepted right to
privacy or data protection. 32 Even among the subset of countries that
recognize such rights, deep disagreement persists over the appropriate scope
or content of those rights, and the appropriate role of courts in reviewing
security practices.33
If the expansion of privacy rights were purely a positive-sum-game, then

few would oppose the implementation of greater individual privacy
protections. However, as alluded to above, privacy protections come at a cost
to security interests, and vice versa. 34 Government security interests
encourage information-gathering tactics that impose limitations on citizens'
interests in their privacy and family life, as well as their "right to be let
alone." 35 Furthermore, the fear of government surveillance may chill
31 See generally Tiffany Li et al., Saving Face: Unfolding the Screen of Chinese Privacy Law,
J. L. INFO. & Ser. (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2826087.
32 See, e.g., Bert-Jaap Koops & Morag Goodwin, Cyberspace, the Cloud, and CrossBorder Criminal Investigation. The Limits and Possibilities of International Law 1, 47
(Tilburg L. Sch., Research Paper No. 5/2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2698263 (stating, in relevant part, that "there is no universally
shared content for the right to privacy or data protection at the international level.");
Data Protection Bill, 10 October 2017, Parl Deb HL (2017) col. 785 (UK),
https://hansard. parliament. uk/Lords/2017-10-10/ debates/A0271 CAB-90BC-49BDB284-664918EE70CA/DataProtectionBill(HL) (quoting the Earl of Lytton in saying,
"[a]s regards international cross-jurisdictional data- I am thinking of beyond the
EU - I wonder how successfully the proposed arrangements will carry forward in the
longer term, bearing in mind that the world market contains numerous players who
for their own purposes and advantage might not be that keen to match the standards
we claim to set for ourselves.").
33 Id.
34 As former President Barack Obama put it, "You can't have 100% security and also
then have 100% privacy and zero inconvenience, ... we're going to have to make some
choices as a society." Peter Nicholas & Siobhan Gorman, Obama Defends Surveillance,
WALL ST. J. (June 8, 2013),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324299104578531742264893564.
35
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. R. 193, 193
(1890). See also Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8, Oct. 10,
2012 O.J. (C 326) 02, http://fra.europa.eu/en/charterpedia/article/8-protection-personaldata (stating, in relevant part, that "[e]veryone has the right to the protection of
personal data concerning him or her."). Such an approach views one's personal

10
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individual freedoms of speech, assembly, and association. 36 On the other
hand, privacy protective measures that reduce government access to
information-gathering methods could hamstring efforts to identify and thwart
dangerous threats to the societies' collective security interests. 37 Accordingly,
the government mandate to ensure the safety of its citizenry requires the
government to undertake some behaviors that intrude into the sphere of
personal privacy.3s
information as commensurate with ownership over one's identity and sense of self.
Allowing governments to share that information can be deeply injurious to one's sense
of identity. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1911
(2013 ),
https ://harvardlawreview .org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/vol126_cohen. pdf
(stating, in relevant part, that "[s]ubjectivity is a function of the interplay between
emergent selfhood and social shaping; privacy, which inheres in the interstices of social
shaping, is what permits that interplay to occur.").
36 There are several famous examples from United States' jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972)
("The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to an unchecked
surveillance power. Nor must the fear of unauthorized official eavesdropping deter
vigorous citizen dissent and discussion of Government action in private conversation.
For private dissent, no less than open public discourse, is essential to our free society.");
see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956, 181 L. Ed. 2d 911
(2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("[a]wareness that the Government may be watching
chills associational and expressive freedoms."). Researchers have sought to show that
the fear of government surveillance does in fact change citizen behavior. See Brynne
O'Neal, What Americans Actually Do When the Government Is Watching, HUFFINGTON POST
(Jul. 20, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/brynne-oneal/what-americansactually-do-when-the-government-is-watching_b_7833408.html; see also BORN ET AL.,
supra note 4, at 45.
37
[Irish] Data Prot. Comm'r, v. Facebook Ireland Ltd. & Maximillian Schrems [2016
No. 4809 P.], 40 (H. Ct.) (Ir.), http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/sh2/HCJ.pdf ("A
degree of surveillance for the purposes of national security, counterterrorism and
combating serious crime is vital for the safeguarding of the freedoms of all citizens of
the union. This necessarily involves interference with the right to privacy, including
data privacy.").
38
As former FBI Agent Asha Rangappa explains, "[a]s any law enforcement official
will tell you, criminals and spies don't show up on the doorstep of law enforcement
with all of their evidence and motives neatly tied up in a bow. Cases begin with leads,
tips, or new information obtained in the course of other cases .... However, anytime
the FBI receives a credible piece of information that could indicate a potential violation
of the law or a threat to national security, it has a legal duty determine whether a basis
for further investigation exists." Asha Rangappa, Don't Fall for the Hype: How the FBI's
11
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The privacy-security tradeoff is not a new phenomenon. In the prelude to
the American independence, colonial Americans well understood the
"difficult tradeoff between safety and freedom." 39 As Alexander Hamilton
argued:
The violent destruction of life and property incident to war; the
continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger,
will compel nations the most attached to liberty, to resort for repose
and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their
civil and political rights. To be more safe, they, at length, become
willing to run the risk of being less free. 40

The challenge that Hamilton faced was the same difficulty that
government decision makers continue to struggle with today: where to strike
the appropriate tradeoffs between privacy and security. 41 As the British
government recently declared, "There are circumstances where the processing
of data is vital for our economy, our democracy and to protect us against
illegality." 42 Today, the question facing states involves grappling with:
how [do] we get the balance right between protecting the freedoms
and civil liberties that underpin our functioning liberal democracy

Use of Section 702 Surveillance Data Really Works, JUST SEC. (Nov 29, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/47428/dont-fall-hype-702-fbi-works. Inevitably, some of
these suspicions will not translate into actual threats to national security or even legal
infractions. This necessary reality of overreach means that bulk data searches must be
"adequately authorised and limited by domestic law." BORN ET AL., supra note 4, at 70.
Presently, such protection "seems to be the exception rather than the norm". Id.
39 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Medina v.
California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992) (providing, in relevant part, that "[t]he Bill of Rights
speaks in explicit terms to many aspects of criminal procedure, and the expansion of
those constitutional guarantees under the open-ended rubric of the Due Process Clause
invites undue interference with both considered legislative judgments and the careful
balance that the Constitution strikes between liberty and order.").
40
Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 8, p. 33).
41 See Eugene Volokh, Liberty, Safety, and Benjamin Franklin, WASH. POST (Nov. 11,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/ll/ll/
liberty-safety-and-benjamin-franklin (emphasizing that the "real challenge is in
deciding which tradeoffs are wise and which are foolish.").
42 Dep't Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, Data Laws To Be Made Fit For Digital Age, UK
Gov. (Sep. 14, 2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/data-laws-to-be-made-fitfor-digital-age.
12
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while protecting that democracy from the various threats to our
safety and well-being. The sophisticated use of new technologies by
terrorist groups and organised crime means that we have to make a
sober assessment of exactly what powers our police and security
services need to combat the terrorist attack and disrupt the drug or
people trafficker or the money launderer. The fact that those threats
are often overlapping and interconnected makes granting powers
and achieving appropriate checks and balances ever more difficult. 43
When Hamilton considered this question, the debate concerned a wholly
domestic issue. The Continental Congress had to engage in introspection and
begin carving a tradeoff consonant with American values. The national nature
of this decision meant that different sovereign countries could strike different
tradeoffs without friction. However, the privacy-security tradeoff for modern,
international intelligence sharing changes that paradigm.
States' national privacy-security balance generates difficult decisions
when

considering

information-sharing

arrangements

with

other

governments. While the privacy concerns are considerable, state security
interests mandate cooperative data sharing as a crucial component of state
practice. Before exploring solutions to conflicting surveillance regimes, the
sections below expand upon the privacy-security tension in cross-border
intelligence sharing.

II.

PRIVACY-SECURITY
TRADEOFF FOR
INTELLIGENCE SHARING

A. Intelligence Sharing Raises Privacy Concerns

As outlined above, domestic privacy protections play an important role in
limiting government intrusion into the private lives of its citizens. 44

Data Protection Bill, 10 October 2017, Parl Deb HL (2017) col. 785 (UK),
https://hansard. parliament. uk/lords/2017-10-10/ debates/22188EC1 -6BAB-4F06-BE645831ABAF78E2/DataProtectionBill(HL ).
44 See, e.g., Myres S. McDougal et al., The Intelligence Function and World Public Order,
46 TEMP. L.Q. 365, 397 (1973) ("Much intelligence inevitably touches upon the private
lives and pursuits of individuals and its dissemination is bound to have at least some
adverse effects.").
43
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Unchecked intrusion threatens to chill the important freedoms of speech,
assembly, and association. 45 If these fears arise from one's own government
surveillance, a fortiori, they are exponentially amplified by data sharing with
foreign governments. 46 Every citizen enjoys national citizenship47 and retains
the peace of mind that their national government owes some obligations and
fealty to protect the interests of their own nationals. 48 No such commitment
exists for foreign government actors, and citizens have no reason to expect
foreign governments to consider foreign citizens' interests when accessing
personal data. 49 To the contrary, if a government receives private information
that allows it to further its own national interests at the foreign citizen's
expense, that government would assuredly do so. Thus, the government's
data sharing practices with foreign governments jeopardize its citizens'
private sense of security, a feeling further enhanced by foreign governments'
freedom to further circulate the private information. 50
Of course, one should not discount the possibility that not only will fear
create chilling effects but that the private information might actually be used
to stifle the above-mentioned rights. Regimes may utilize shared information

45
46

See supra notes 23-36.
See, e.g., Privacy Int'l, supra note 11 ("States may share intelligence with States

known for violating international law, .... Such sharing can place individuals in those
States at particular risk.").
47 See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness art. 1, Aug.
30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175.
48 See, e.g., Myres S. McDougal et al., Nationality and Human Rights, 83 YALE L. J. 900,
960 (1974) (stating that "on the transnational level[,] nationality is the right to have
protection in rights").
49 See, e.g., Robin Simcox, Europe, Stop Trying to Make 'Intelligence Sharing' Happen,
FOREIGNPOL'Y (Apr. 14, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/14/europe-stop-tryingto-mak-brussels-paris-bombings ("Brits may have become used to the CCTV cameras
and Automatic Number Plate Recognition technology that allows their own
government to monitor their travel-but they would be considerably more dubious
about letting the Germans and the French do the same.").
so See generally Jennifer Daskal, Law Enforcement Access to Data Across Borders: The
Evolving Security and Rights Issues, 8 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & PoL'Y 473 (2016),
http://jnslp.com/wp-content/u ploads/2016/11/Law_Enforcement_Access_to_Data_
Across_Borders_2.pdf (detailing ways through which collection of private information
can stifle rights and freedoms).
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to monitor political dissidents or regime opponents living as part of a foreign
diaspora community. 51 Such privacy and even safety concerns may pose a
barrier to data sharing agreements with countries bearing shaky human rights
records. 52 Even when shared information would not lead to concrete harm,
countries may also hesitate to share information to partners with poor privacy
safeguards due to the belief that the mere access to the private information
constitutes severe dignitary harm.
Similar considerations also weigh in favor of caution before utilizing
shared data received from an intelligence partner. If the intelligence partner
does not honor the same degree of privacy as the home state, the home state
may fear complicity in privacy or human rights violations. 53 The "Originator
Rule" allows the original collector of information to govern the subsequent
downstream flow of the information. 54 If an intelligence agency receives
information from a foreign counterpart, the information originator may
choose to not include the sources or procedures by which the agency acquired
this information. As such, the recipient agency may unknowingly utilize
private information that was unlawfully gathered under foreign laws.
Agencies can also take advantage of disparate protective regimes through
the deliberate use of a "revolving door" tactic. The "revolving door" describes
a mechanism through which government intelligence agencies rely on foreign

BORN ET AL., supra note 4, at 45. By the same token, however, sharing information
about domestic dissidents might have a significantly smaller chilling effect. American
political dissidents might fear retaliatory action by the United States yet would
probably be far less concerned about repercussions from a removed country like China.
See Stephen J. Schulhofer, An International Right to Privacy? Be Careful What You Wish
For, 14 INT'L J. CONST. L. 238 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mow013; Ashley
Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, VA. J. INT'L L. 291, 346 (2015)
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2490700; Asaf Lubin, 'We Only Spy on Foreigners': The Myth of
a Universal Right to Privacy and the Practice of Foreign Mass Surveillance, 18 CHI. J. INT'L L.
502, 534 (2018) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3008428 ("Chinese, French, and Russian
intelligence agents do not have the time or inclination to harass random Americans,
nor the capability as long as Americans remain in the United States.").
52 Lefebvre, supra note 12, at 535.
53
AIDAN WILLS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT 25 (2010),
http://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/IntelligenceOversight_
en.pd£.
54 Lubin, supra note 51.
51
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collection to collect information that they could not have legally collected
under their domestic legal frameworks.ss This is not merely an abstract
concern. Part 0 describes the United States' lack of privacy protection for nonU.S. citizens located abroad. Insofar as foreign intelligence partners such as
the Five Eyes coalition have access to United States intelligence databases, U.S.
overseas collection practices may directly facilitate a legal quagmire for those
foreign agencies.s 6 While the bulk collection may have been legal under
United States law, these partners might not have legal authorization to collect
such information. The revolving door is not a one-way street: the Wall Street
Journal has also reported that Europeans have also collected intelligence
information for American intelligence agencies.s 7 As David Cole and Federico
Fabrinni note, "Reports of cooperation and mass intelligence sharing between
the NSA and the General Communication Headquarters (GCHQ), the United
Kingdom's surveillance agency, make these concerns even more
immediate."ss Thus, intelligence sharing agreements should account for the
legitimate privacy interests implicated in inter-governmental data transfers.
B. Effective Security Requires Intelligence Sharing

Policing and counterterrorism efforts necessarily depend on cross-border data
sharing.s 9 The modern era has ushered in an age of advanced communications
technologies and increasingly sophisticated threats that do not confine
themselves to national borders. In the globalized 21st century, effective
national security practices require not only data access among national law

55

Id.

56

See Kim et al., supra note 8.

57

Adam Entous & Siobhan Gorman, Europeans Shared Spy Data With U.S., WALL ST.

J. (Oct. 29, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/us-says-france-spain-aided-nsaspying-1383065709.
58
Cole & Fabbrini, supra note 30, at 222.
59
Andrew Keane Woods, Against DataExceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 729, 742 (2016)
(stating, in relevant part, that "Governments seek lawful access to Internet data for a
host of reasons, including counterterrorism operations, immigration control, and many
other administrative matters.").
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enforcement and intelligence agencies but also cooperative data sharing with
international intelligence partners. 60
In today's global economy, the idea of data fails to comport with
traditional borders, and security threats have adopted a transnational nature. 61
As Professor Jennifer Daskal points out, "The ease and speed with which data
travels across borders, the seemingly arbitrary paths it takes, and the physical
disconnect between where data is stored and where it is accessed critically test
these foundational premises [of territoriality]." 62 In a world of non-territorial
data, blocking foreign security data streams can have significantly adverse
consequences.

As President Obama observed, "[E]merging threats from

terrorist groups and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction place
new and in some ways more complicated demands on our intelligence
agencies. Globalization and the Internet made these threats more acute, as
technology erased borders and empowered individuals to project great
violence ...." 63 One Irish Court recently recognized that limitations on legal

Id. at 745 ("This is striking: a police officer now must cross an international border
in order to do her job, whereas twenty or even ten years ago, the same officer might
have been able to investigate a routine crime like kidnapping without leaving her
country. Just as crime has become increasingly global, evidence gathering has followed
suit."). This trend has long been in the works. See McDougal et al., supra note 44, at
424 (noting that increasing global interrelation has "rendered intelligence gathering a
global operation requiring more institutional and ad hoc cooperation across political
boundaries.").
61
But see Woods, supra note 59, at 763 ("At a deep conceptual level, data is not as
novel as the data exceptionalists suggest. None of the features that are thought to make
data novel are in fact novel-whether the features are considered individually or as a
whole-and in fact, data is an easier case than some other assets because data has a
physical location wherever it is stored").
62 Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L. J. 326 (2015).
63
Ashley Deeks, Confronting and Adapting: Intelligence Agencies and International Law,
102 VA. L. REV. 599, 622 (2016) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2768339 (citing Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence,
WHITE HOUSE OFFICE PRESS SEC'Y (Jan. 17, 2014),
https ://obamawhi tehouse .archives .gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/remarkspresident-review-signals-intelligence ).
60
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security sharing "has potentially extremely significant implications for the
safety and security of residents within the European Union." 64
This reflects a larger truth that as transnational integration has developed,
so too has state susceptibility to intervention or interruption by individuals
located around the world. As criminal activity takes an increasingly
international flavor, 65 domestic information alone proves insufficient to
provide safety in the twenty-first century. This position does not merely
reflect theoretical rhetoric arising from the desire to shape the modern global
citizen. Rather, this position has been cemented by empirical experience: it is
widely accepted among the global intelligence community that international
data sharing incidents have contributed to saving many lives. 66 To highlight
one well-cited example, Canada's refusal to accept Indian intelligence
information regarding a threat of homegrown Canadian Sikh extremist
nationalists resulted in the destruction of Air India Flight 182 and cost 329
lives. 67
In addition to preventing the loss of life, intelligence-sharing agreements
provide a number of important benefits. Intelligence sharing with foreign
governments helps provide a more complete picture of often-cryptic
circumstances that allow "military commanders, law enforcement officials,

64
[Irish] Data Prot. Comm'r, v. Facebook Ireland Ltd. & Maximillian Schrems [2016
No. 4809 P.], 3 (H. Ct.) (Ir.), http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/sh2/HCJ.pdf.
65 For example, "between October 2014 and September 2015, the UK Financial
Intelligence Unit (UKFIU) received 1,566 requests from international partners for
financial intelligence. Of these, at least 800 came from EU Member States. In the same
period, the UKFIU proactively disseminated 571 pieces of financial intelligence to
international financial intelligence units, 200 of which went to Europol." The Exchange
and Protection of Personal Data: A Future Partnership Paper, HM Gov'T (2017),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6398
53/The_exchange_and_protection_of_personal_data.pdf; see also Woods, supra note 59,
at 744-745 (2016) (presenting U.K. Government Requests for Internet Data from Major
U.S. Service Providers in 2014).
66
See, e.g., BORN ET AL., supra note 4, at 33 ("[I]nternational intelligence cooperation
can help to safeguard the right to life, and it can prevent serious threats to public safety.
It is widely accepted that information sharing has contributed to the prevention of
numerous terrorist attacks over the past decade, saving many lives.")
67
See id. at 41 (citing COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE INVESTIGATION OF THE BOMBING
OF AIR INDIA FLIGHT 182, 422-31 (2010)).
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and policymakers to improve the quality of their decision making." 68
Additionally, data sharing provides for significant cost-savings and enables
operational efficiencies. Data sharing delivers benefits in the division of labor,
reducing the burden of duplicative investigative efforts, and leveraging
specialized areas of expertise. 69 Take the example of human intelligence. 70 As
the self-proclaimed Islamic State loses the last of its territory and resources,
many fear that it will increasingly turn its focus to conducting international
terrorism. 71 As such, governments who fear that they are potential targets will
seek to place clandestine operatives within the organization or recruit
informants. Such measures are extremely costly, and the duplication of effort
may itself compromise the efficacy of individual missions. Moreover, certain
governments will have comparative advantages-in this scenario, Middle
Eastern governments will likely have more native language speakers and
citizens with plausible ties to the region or conflict. At first glance, the ISIS
case might seem distinguishable from the privacy concerns explored in this
Article. However, even in this extreme scenario of the Islamic State, the
Islamic State's international ambitions involve cross-border communications
and association with and surveillance of individuals located around the world.
When intelligence agencies can engage in information sharing, they benefit
from the collective efficiencies.

Id. at 34.
Id. at 36 ("Close allies can work to avoid duplication of information collection
efforts . . .. It may be easier for a service to work with a foreign partner whose
intelligence officials and/or agents share these [specialized] characteristics"); Janine
McGruddy, Multilateral Intelligence Collaboration and International Oversight, 6 J.
STRATEGIC SEC. 214, 215 (2013) http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article= 1317 &context=jss ("No one country can effectively cover all the areas of interest
that their intelligence collection requirements demand.")
70 Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is defined by the Central Intelligence Agency as
"any information that can be gathered from human sources." INTelligence: Human
Intelligence, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (last updated Apr. 30, 2013),
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-featured-storyarchive/intelligence-human-intelligence .html.
71 See, e.g., Daniel Byman, Beyond Iraq and Syria: ISIS' Ability to Conduct Attacks Abroad,
LAWFARE (Jun. 15, 2017, 11:14 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/beyond-iraq-andsyria-isis-ability-conduct-attacks-abroad ("This loss of territory and resources,
however, increases the Islamic State's desire to conduct international terrorism.").
68
69
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Intelligence sharing practices also lead to security improvements by
effectuating peer review. 72 The nature of intelligence-sharing work can often
insulate such practices from substantive agency review by other areas of the
government.

Through coordination with foreign government agencies,

intelligence sharing establishes an avenue for an outside party to provide the
intelligence agency with professional feedback. In doing so, intelligencesharing agreements play an invaluable role in providing an objective and
critical review of practices that lay "largely shielded" from external review. 73
While peer review provides a helpful informal model for intelligence
feedback, it should not serve as the only source of oversight-an issue that
receives extensive attention infra.
Finally, intelligence-sharing agreements permit governments to control
the external information flow to other governments.

Through such

arrangements, governments can tailor the amount of information that they
share with partners and can withhold sensitive material or titrate the
circumstances in which they distribute such information. Cooperation can
limit the degree to which foreign governments expend the resources to surveil
non-citizens, thereby decreasing the risk of incidental foreign espionage
threatening national security. These positive externalities of lessened foreign
government espionage have encouraged even privacy advocates to push for
data sharing regimes motivated by the belief that agreements will bolster
citizens' protections against foreign government surveillance. 74

See Deeks supra note 63, at 640.
supra note 4, at 36 ("Exchanging information and intelligence analyses
with foreign partners can provide services with alternative perspectives on key issues
and help them to challenge their own assumptions ... the professional criticism that
foreign partners can provide may be invaluable. Accordingly, services with close
relationships will sometimes solicit comments on their strategic analyses.")
74 See Cole & Fabbrini, supra note 30, at 236-37.
72

73 BORN ET AL.,

20

2019]

Ill.

LEGALIZING INTELLIGENCE SHARING

COUNTRIES STRIKE
DIFFERENT PRIVACYSECURITY BALANCES FOR
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
REGIMES

While popular imagery may paint a privacy-loving Europe and a securityobsessed United States, the reality is that when it comes to government
surveillance, experts have recognized that

/1
[

s] afeguards under American law,

for all their shortcomings, are far more robust than those now found or likely
to emerge elsewhere," including in Europe. 75 European Union member states
themselves hold widely varying views on the appropriate tradeoff balance on
"such fundamental issues as the required level of suspicion, the role of
suspect-specific judicial approval ex-ante, and the degree to which
transparency and oversight." 76
Taken holistically, EU law provides substantially more protection against
government surveillance in three ways. First, it does not accept the third-party
doctrine found in American jurisprudence, which robs individuals of a
reasonable expectation of privacy-in other words, a privacy interest-in
information that has been revealed to a third party. 77 The third-party doctrine
has led American courts to reject a privacy interest in information given to a
third party "even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will
be used only for a limited purpose." 78 The EU also imposes greater privacy
Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 245. See, e.g., Entous & Gorman, supra note 57,
(statement of Rep. Mike Rogers) ("[The U.S. is] the only intelligence service in the world
that is forced to go to a court before they even collect on foreign intelligence operations,
which is shocking to me.").
76 Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 245 ("There is wide variation, even among Western
democracies, on such fundamental issues as the required level of suspicion, the role of
suspect-specific judicial approval ex ante, and the degree to which transparency and
oversight are relaxed in the national security context.").
77 Id.
78 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
However, the United States
jurisprudence on the third-party doctrine may be shifting for online information. See,
e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (limiting the scope of third-party
doctrine by requiring a warrant for cell phone geo-location data lasting longer than a
week); see also Brian Mund, Social Media Searches and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy,
75
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restrictions on the private sector, including limitations on the retention and
use of data and has recognized a right to be forgotten. 79 The EU is also subject
to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), where the Court has built a
considerable foundation for privacy protection, including a right against
secret monitoring of postal and telephonic communications, 80 real-time
communications interceptions, 81 and bulk data collection. 82 However, the
ECtHR maintained wide discretion to state actors by granting a "margin of
appreciation" in the national security and surveillance context. 83
That is not to say that the United States is insensitive to privacy concerns;
the central understanding of American privacy arises from the notion of
freedom from state surveillance. 84 In three other ways, American law provides
more privacy protections than the EU for government intelligence. First, while
American law requires FISA authorization, EU law does not require judicial
oversight. 85 Second, EU law does not require individualized suspicion for
intelligence searches, which allows for greater bulk collection flexibility than
is allowed in the U.S. 86 Third, EU law lacks "the detailed specificity of the US

19 YALE J. L. & TECH. 238, 256-57 (2017) http://yjolt.org/sites/default/files/
mund19yjolt238_0.pdf (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated a
willingness to reconsider the third party doctrine for digital information).
79 Schulhofer supra note 51, at 249.
so Klass v. Germany, App. No. 5029/71, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), Judgment (1978),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng ?i=OOl -57510.
81 Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, (1984) Eur. H.R. Rep. 14 (telephone
interception); Copland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 62617/00, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment
(2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=OOl-79996 (email interception).
82 Rotaru v. Romania, App. No. 28341/95, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment (2000),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=OOl-58586; Marper v. United Kingdom, Apps. No.
30562/04 & 30566/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment (2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng ?i =001-90051.
83 Cole & Fabbrini, supra note 30, at 227.
84 James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113
YALE L. J. 1151, 1211-13 (2004), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/246_ftn7jo8w.pdf
("Suspicion of the state has always stood at the foundation of American privacy
thinking.").
85
Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 249.
86 Id at 249-50.
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Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)," which has left national security
practices largely unregulated. 87
However, the U.S. Fourth Amendment's protection against "unreasonable
searches and seizures" 88 is not absolute, and the United States has shifted
towards a greater security emphasis in the aftermath of the September 11
attacks. Most notably, the USA PATRIOT Act 89 has realigned the balance
between the government and American citizens over the scope of reasonable
privacy intrusions for national security purposes. 90 The PATRIOT Act
included provisions that added a broad new definition of domestic terrorism
under 18 U.S.C. § 2331 91 and allowed for delayed notice for certain searches
and interceptions, 92 thereby facilitating extended covert operations. 93
Furthermore, the United States has extended Fourth Amendment procedural
protections for domestic national security gathering 94 and has prevented the
bulk data collection of all American telephone metadata records. 95 The United
States offers much less protection to non-U.S. persons located abroad and has

87

Id. at 250.

88

U.S. CONST. Amend. IV.
Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 1, 115 Stat. 272, 272-75.
90 Patricia Mell, Big Brother at the Door: Balancing National Security with Privacy under
the USA Patriot Act, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 375, 379 (2002) ("The PATRIOT Act attacks the
balance between the government and the individual by a systematic circumvention of
established doctrine and procedures guarding against unreasonable governmental
intrusion").
91 See18 U.S.C. § 2331; Patriot Act, H.R. 3162, 107th Cong.§ 802 (2001).
92
18 U.S.C. § 3103(a).
93
USA Freedom Act: What's In, What's Out, WASH. POST (Jun. 2, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/usa-freedom-act (stating that the
USA Freedom Act reauthorized the PATRIOT Act while modifying some of the
government's bulk data collection powers). See generally USA FREEDOM Act of 2015,
Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 267 (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/
house-bill/2048? q={%22search%22%3A[%22 \ %22hr2048 \ %22%22]}.
94 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972)
(holding government's national security concerns "do not justify departure in this case
from the customary Fourth Amendment requirement of judicial approval prior to
initiation of a search or surveillance.").
95
See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 796 (2d Cir. 2015)
(interpreting §215 of the PATRIOT Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861, to not authorize bulk data
collection of American telephone records).
89
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authorized extensive foreign collection data collection, even if the data also
captures communications concerning persons located within the United
States. 96
The United States and Europe also differ in their approach to judicial
review. 97 The European Union tilts heavily towards judicial engagement to
protect individual privacy rights. 98 The contrast between the United States
and European Union approach on the scope of judicial reviewability shines
through a conclusion by the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review (FISCR). Rather than allow substantive privacy interests to
narrow legitimate national security methods, the FISCR judges instead
recognized that "where the government has instituted several layers of

United States v. Mohamud, 2014 WL 2866749, at *15 (D. Or. June 24, 2014), aff'd,
843 F.3d 420, 440 (9th Cir. 2016) ("The§ 702 acquisition targeting a non-U.S. person
overseas is constitutionally permissible, so, under the general rule, the incidental
collection of defendant's communications with the extraterritorial target would be
lawful."). See also Redacted, 2011 WL 10945618, at *27 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011)
(providing, in relevant part, that "incidental collections occurring as a result of
constitutionally permissible acquisitions do not render those acquisitions unlawful.").
President Obama' s Presidential Policy Directive 28 added additional safeguards for
non-U.S. citizens located abroad and required that "signals intelligence activities must
take into account that all persons should be treated with dignity and respect[.]" See also
Presidential Policy Directive No. 28, Signals Intelligence Activities § 1 (Jan. 17, 2014)
[hereinafter
PPD-28],
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-directi ve-signals-intelligence-activi ties.
97
This difference has been characterized as a "ballot-box democracy" in the U.S.
versus a "fundamental rights" model of judicial review in Europe. See Francesca
Bignami & Giorgio Resta, Human Rights Extraterritoriality: The Right to Privacy and
National Security Surveillance at 19, in EYAL BENVENISTI & GEORG NOLTE, THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY SURVEILLANCE IN COMMUNITY INTERESTS ACROSS
INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming), https://scholarship.law .gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi ?referer= https ://scholar .google. com/&httpsredir=1&article=2562&context=faculty_
publications.
98 See, e.g., Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland & Others v
Minister for Communications, Marine & Natural Resources and Others, E.C.J.,
Judgment (Grand Chamber Apr. 8, 2014), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0293&from=EN
(holding
that
"EU
legislature's discretion is reduced" because of the fundamental right to respect for
private life, the government's stated legitimate interest in national security
notwithstanding.).
96
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serviceable safeguards to protect individuals against unwarranted harms and
to minimize incidental intrusions, its efforts to protect national security should
not be frustrated by the courts." 99
Neither the United States nor the European Union represents the full
range in which states establish their privacy-security tradeoff. For example,
Japan has traditionally sat at the extreme "privacy" end of the privacy-security
spectrum. 100 The Japanese government's ability to engage in surveillance and
interception practices has been highly curtailed, including for national
security purposes. 101 Japan has a wiretap law, but "Japanese culture strongly
opposes government interceptions, and the authority is rarely used." 102 Until
June 2017, Japan did not have a statutory basis for authorizing
communications interceptions for counter-terrorism purposes. 103 However,
Japan's robust privacy anti-interception laws do not translate to a complete
lack of authorization for counter-terror activity. In 2016, the Japanese
Supreme Court granted $880,000 to Muslim plaintiffs for privacy violations
related to a leak of police files that revealed blanket surveillance of religious
Muslims in Japan. 104 Nevertheless, Japan's Supreme Court affirmed a lower

In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
551F.3d1004, 1016 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008).
100 See Rubinstein et al., supra note 30, at 104 ("At the opposite extreme, Japan and
Brazil are notable for the severe limits they impose on interceptions undertaken for
foreign intelligence security purposes.").
101 Id.
102 Id. at 109 ("Japanese society strongly disfavours the use of wiretaps and the
number of communications intercepts is miniscule."). See also Toshimaru Ogura,
99

Toward Global Communication Rights: Movements Against Wiretapping and Monitoring in
Japan, TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE (2018), https://www.tni.org/en/archives/act/2691 (last
visited Oct. 11, 2018).
103
Andy Sharp, Abe Passes Controversial Bill Boosting Japan Surveillance Powers,
BLOOMBERG (Jun. 14, 201710:06 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201706-15/abe-passes-controversial-bill-boosting-japan-surveillance-powers; Rubinstein et
al., supra note 30, at 109 ("Japanese law lacks any statutory basis for authorizing
wiretaps for counter-terrorism purposes.").
104 Ian Monroe, Top Court Green-Lights Surveillance o!Japan 's Muslims, AL JAZEERA (Jun.
29, 2016),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/top-court-green-lights-surveillance-japanmuslims-160629040956466.html.
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court ruling permitting intelligence profiling and surveillance as "necessary
and inevitable" to guard against the threat of international terrorism.ms
At the other end of the spectrum, China and India heavily subordinate
privacy interests to possible security needs in a way that neither the United
States, the European Union, nor Japan would find appropriate. Both China
/1

and India are distinguished by their almost total" lack of privacy protection
from government monitoring and oversight. In India, the Indian Intelligence
Bureau (IB) faces little public accountability.m 6 In fact, the IB, which has
existed since 1887, might not even have any legislative basis in modern Indian
law.m 7 The Indian government has also bolstered its surveillance capabilities
through establishing a Central Monitoring System that enables government
interception of emails, chats, voice calls and text messages without the
assistance of third party service providers.ms

In addition, the Indian

government has over 1.18 billion citizensm in its Aadhaar identification
9

system based on biometric and demographic information and has disabled
encryption between telephones and network stations, which facilitates
government

10s

interception

of

communications

transmissions. 110

The

Id.

Pranesh Prakash, How Surveillance Works in India, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 10 2013, 2:29
AM),
https ://india.blogs .nytimes .com/2013/07/10 /how -surveillance-works-in-india
(stating that "[n]o intelligence agency in India has been created under an act of
Parliament with clearly established roles and limitations on powers, and hence there is
no public accountability whatsoever.").
107 See Subramanium to Katju: The Dangerous Elevation of the IB Report, FIRST POST
(Jul. 24, 2014), http://www.firstpost.com/india/subramanium-to-katju-the-dangerouselevation-of-the-ib-report-1631981.html (noting that the IB is "agency established
under an administrative order without any constitutional or statutory identity"). See
also Explain Intelligence Bureau's Legality, HC Tells Centre, TIMES INDIA (Mar. 26, 2012),
https://timesofindia.indiatimes. com/india/Explain-Intelligence-Bureaus-legality-HCtells-Centre/ articleshow/12408605 .ems.
108 Rubinstein et al., supra note 30, at 98; Leo Mirani, Think US snooping is bad? Try
Italy, India or ... Canada, QUARTZ (Jun. 10, 2013), https://qz.com/92648/think-ussnooping-is-bad-try-italy-india-or-canada.
109
Unique Identification Authority of India, Welcome toAADHAAR Dashboard, Gov'T
INDIA, https://uidai.gov.in/aadhaar_dashboard (last visited Feb. 28, 2019).
110 See generally Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Your Secret Stingray's No
106

Secret Anymore: The Vanishing Government Monopoly over Cell Phone Surveillance and Its
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government has wide discretion in utilizing this information for national
security and other "public interest" purposes. 111 While a 1996 Supreme Court
decision recognized that wiretapping constitutes an invasion of privacy, 112 the
Indian government retains relatively wide discretion in collecting and
utilizing information for national security and other "public interest"
purposes. 113 Finally, India's laws grant procedural review by a committee of
the law enforcement official's colleagues but critics have questioned its
procedural credibility.114
China grants broad security powers to its security forces.

As China

scholar James Fry notes, "there are only a few legal limitations on the
authorities when it comes to Internet surveillance, with the vast majority of
laws providing the authorities many express powers over content
censorship." 115 The Chinese Ministry of Public Security has undertaken the
ambitious "Police Cloud" project, which, similarly to the Indian Aadhaar,
collects a vast amount of information tied to citizens' unique national
identification number. 116 China has also installed over 20 million cameras in

Impact on National Security and Consumer Privacy, 28 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1 (2014),
https://ssrn.com/ abstract=2437678.
111 Rhyea Malik & Subhajit Basu, India's Dodgy Mass Surveillance Project Should
Concern Us All, WIRED (Aug. 25, 2017), http://www.wired.eo.uk/article/india-aadhaarbiometrics-privacy; Prashant Reddy, Data Protection: Can India Overcome the SpySecurity State and Big Tech To Enact a Strong Law?, SCROLL (Aug. 22, 2017),
https://scroll.in/article/846946/data-protection-can-india-overcome-the-spy-securitystate-and-big-tech-to-enact-a-strong-law. See also Data Protection Laws of the World:
India, DLA PIPER (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/
index.html?t=law&c=IN (stating that "[t]here is no specific legislation on privacy and
data protection in India.").
112 See Prakash, supra note 106; Bhairav Acharya, Mastering the Art of Keeping Indians
Under Surveillance, WIRE (May 30, 2015), https://thewire.in/2756/mastering-the-art-ofkeeping-indians-under-surveillance.
113 See supra note 109.
114 See Acharya, supra note 112.
115 James D. Fry, Privacy, Predictability And Internet Surveillance In The U.S. And China:
Better The Devil You Know?, 37 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 419, 478 (2016), http://scholarship.
law .upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? article= 1910&context=jil.
116 China: Police 'Big Data' Systems Violate Privacy, Target Dissent, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Nov. 19, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/19/china-police-big-datasystems-violate-privacy-target-dissent.
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the past few years as means of more closely monitoring its population. 117 With
its extensive infrastructure, China has also introduced real-time facial
recognition tracking 118 as well as voice recognition forensics for unidentified
targets in phone conversations. 119 Chinese policies have also generated less
expectation of privacy among the Chinese public. In one recent study, only 50
percent of Chinese consumers acknowledged the need for caution in sharing
personal information online, and reflected a "more cavalier approach"
towards data privacy among Chinese citizens. 120 In contrast, the average
acknowledgment of data privacy caution in ten other countries exceeded 75
percent. 121 The Washington Post reports that spying in China is so pervasive
that government officials often spy upon one another- leading to a practice of
hugging at the beginning of meetings in order to pat down their counterparts
for hidden microphones. 122
China's trajectory appears to continue empowering widespread national
security surveillance activity. China's Anti-Terrorism Law (ATL) requires
telecommunication and Internet providers within Chinese jurisdiction to

117 Frank Langfitt, In China, Beware: A Camera May Be Watching You, NAT'LPUB. RADIO
(Jan. 29, 2013), https://www.npr.org/2013/0l/29/170469038/in-china-beware-a-cameramay-be-watching-you.
118 Ms. Smith, Skynet in China: Real-life 'Person of Interest' spying in real time, CSO
ONLINE (Sep. 28, 2017), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3228444/security/skynet-inchina-real-life-person-of-interest-spying-in-real-time.html.
119 See China: Voice Biometric Collection Threatens Privacy, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct.
22, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/22/china-voice-biometric-collectionthreatens-privacy.
120 See George G. Chen & Tiffany G. Wong, Waiting for China's Data Protection Law,
DIPLOMAT (Aug. 12, 2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/waiting-for-chinas-dataprotection-law. See also Peter Fuhrman, Government Cyber-Surveillance is the Norm in
China-And Its Popular, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/cyber-surveillance-is-a-w ay-of-life-in-china/2016/01/29I e4e856dc-c476-11 e5a4aa-f25866ba0dc6_story .html (stating that "none [of my Chinese friends] expressed
the slightest quibble about their government knowing where they travel or when they
receive international calls.").
121 See Chen & Wong, supra note 120.
122
Max Fisher, Chinese Government Officials Are Constantly Wiretapping And Spying On
One Another, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/worldviews/wp/2013/02/19/chinese-government-officials-are-constantlywiretapping-and-spying-on-one-another.
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grant data access and decryption support to government authorities under the
ambit of national security. 123 Given the government's sweeping authority to
take "all necessary" steps to guard China's sovereignty, 124 the ATL effectively
grants access to any and all locally stored data that the Chinese government
might want. 125 Finally, an updated Intelligence Law promotes a similar
purpose, broadly allowing Chinese security officials to "make inquiries of any
individuals as part of their intelligence-gathering, and to examine their
reference materials and files [and] commandeer the communications
equipment, transportation, buildings, and other facilities of individuals as
well as organizations and government organs."126
In short, countries ranging from Japan, the European Union, the United
States, India and China all display a wide array of preferences and values
regarding their internal balance between privacy and national security
interests. In the age of transnational data, these balances necessarily bleed

Courtney M. Bowman et al., A Primer on China's New Cybersecurity Law: Privacy,
Cross-Border Transfer Requirements, and Data Localization, PROSKAUER (May 9, 2017),
123

https ://privacylaw. proskauer. com/2017/05/ articles/international/a-primer-on-chinasnew-cybersecuri ty-law-pri vacy-cross-border-tr ansfer-requirements-and-datalocalization (stating that decryption assistance has not included a requirement to
surrender decryption keys); Alyssa Abkowitz & Eva Dou, Apple to Build China Data
Center to Meet New Cybersecurity Law, WALL ST. J. (Jul. 12, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-to-build-china-data-center-to-meet-newcybersecurity-law-1499861507; Dante D'Orazio, China Passes Controversial AntiTerrorism Law To Access Encrypted User Accounts, VERGE (Dec. 27, 2015),
https ://www. the verge. com/2015/12/27/10670346/ china-passes-law-to-accessencrypted-communications (stating that "[t]he new law does not require that
companies operating in China hand over encryption keys.").
124 This carte blanche is conferred pursuant to China's National Security Law. See
Bowman et al., supra note 123.
125 See D'Orazio supra note 123 ("President Obama raised his concerns over draft
regulations with China's President Xi Jinping, saying that the rules amounted to a
dangerous backdoor to internet services.").
126 Murray Scot Tanner, Beijing's New National Intelligence Law: From Defense to Offense,
LAWFARE (Jul. 20, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/beijings-new-nationalintelligence-law-defense-offense; China Activists Fear Increased Surveillance With New
Security Law, REUTERS (May 25, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chinasecurity-int/china-activists-fear-increased-surveillance-with-new-security-lawidUSKBN18M09U.
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beyond state borders and create difficult questions for intelligence sharing
between various agencies. The next section explores some of the barriers to
intelligence sharing that have arisen in the face of this tradeoff.
IV.

BARRIERS TO CROSSBORDER INTELLIGENCE
REGIME

The privacy-security value disparity has led to pressure on intelligence
sharing regimes. Most notably, the European Union has engaged in unilateral
pressure to push states to modify their intelligence sharing practices and adopt
greater privacy rights protections. The European Union has most actively
imported privacy requirements onto other countries' intelligence gathering
practices. Taking action in the name of international human rights, European
Courts have led the effort to institute intelligence-sharing safeguards
consistent with its interpretation of European human rights obligations.
Europe's extraterritorial privacy governance has not been limited to national
security practices, but has rather been part of a larger effort to govern global
privacy law. 127 As legal scholars Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu recognize, "For
many purposes, the European Union is today the effective sovereign of global
privacy law." 128 While European Courts have seized control of the EU' s

Canada has undertaken similar efforts more recently, but its actions have not had
the same effect. For example, the Canadian Supreme Court also ordered Google to
erase search results worldwide associated with a regarding an accusation of
misappropriating confidential information and trade secrets. See Google Inc. v.
Equustek Solutions Inc., 2017 SCC 34, '[3, https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scccsc/en/16701/l/document.do; see also Jacob Gershman, Judge Rules Canada Can't Make
Google Delete Search Results in U.S., WALL ST. J. (Nov. 3, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/judge-rules-canada-cant-make-google-delete-searchresults-in-u-s-1509745395. A U.S court rejected the attempt to apply the Canadian
ruling to U.S. jurisdiction. Google LLC v. Equustek Sols. Inc., 2017 WL 5000834, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2017) ("By forcing intermediaries to remove links to third-party
material, the Canadian order ... threatens free speech on the global internet."). As one
analyst explains, this decision suggests that countries will not succeed in
extraterritorial enforcement in the United States. Gershman, supra.
128 See Jack Goldsmith & Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless
World, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, (2006). See also Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.5. Privacy
127
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privacy exportation, many of the European Union member states would like
to strike a different balance-especially in the intelligence sphere. 129
In recent years, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has
increasingly expanded its authority to review Member States' national
security activity. In particular, the CJEU has actively policed data sharing
practices for national security purposes, thereby influencing the security
tradeoff for both the EU member states and also EU national security partners.
The primary barrier of cross-border influence lies in CJEU' s commitment to
enforcing an adequate level of protection" 130 for data transfers beyond the
/1

Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1966 (2013) ("The
EU has played a major role in international decisions involving information privacy, a
role that has been bolstered by the authority of EU member states to block data
transfers to third party nations, including the United States."); Graham Greenleaf, The
Influence of European Data Privacy Standards Outside Europe: Implications for Globalisation
of Convention 108, 2 INT'L DATA PRIVACY L. 68, 77 (2012) (stating, in relevant part, that
"something reasonably described as 'European standard' data privacy laws are
becoming the norm in most parts of the world.").
129 Privacy watchdog Privacy International has reported inconsistencies between EU
member state practice and CJEU decisions. For example, as of July 2017, zero EU
member states had adjusted their data retention practices or surveillance laws into
compliance consistent with the 2016 CJEU Watson decision. See National Data Retention
Laws Since the C]EU's Tele-2/Watson Judgment, PRIVACY INT'L (Sept. 2017),
https ://priv acyinternational.org/sites/default/files/Data%20Retention_2017. pdf.
Analysts have also noted that the UK's departure from the European Union was
motivated at least in part by its antipathy towards the CJEU. See, e.g., Elizabeth Piper,
Britain Outlines Plans To Break Free of European Court, Bus. INSIDER (Aug. 22, 2017),
http://www. businessinsider .com/r-britain-outlines-plans-to-break-free-of-europeancourt-after-brexi t-2017 -8 ("The European court, or ECJ, is hated by many pro-Brexit
lawmakers in May's governing Conservative Party, who say it has slowly sucked
power from British courts and parliament."). While the UK currently remains a
European Union member state, it has reiterated its position on the CJEU's limited
jurisdiction during the introduction of its recent data protection bill. According to the
UK government, "National security is outside the scope of EU law. Consequently, the
processing of personal data for national security purposes is not within scope of the
GDPR or the Law Enforcement Directive ("LED")." Home Office, Data Protection Bill:
Factsheet-National Security Data Processing, DEP'T DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA & SPORT,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6448
29/2017-09-13 _Factsheet04_national_security_1_.pdf.
130 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
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EU, even when it blends into the sphere of national security. In Schrems v. Data

Protection Commissioner (Case C-362/14), the CJEU invalidated the transatlantic
Safe Harbor agreement allowing for personal data sharing between European
Union member states and the United States. 131 The CJEU overruled the Irish
Data Protection Commissioner and found that in light of the Snowden
revelations, the United States did not provide "adequate" protection to the
personal data of E.U. citizens under the Safe Harbor framework. 132 In rejecting
the 15-year old agreement that governed the data transfers for over 4,500
companies, 133 the CJEU pronounced that its preferred tradeoff balance must
govern both the European Union, and the United States. The CJEU held:
The right to respect for private life, guaranteed by Article 7 of the
Charter and by the core values common to the traditions of the
Member States, would be rendered meaningless if the State
authorities were authorised to access electronic communications on
a casual and generalised basis without any objective justification
based on considerations of national security or the prevention of
crime that are specific to the individual concerned and without those
practices being accompanied by appropriate and verifiable
safeguards. 134

The CJEU asserted its ability to review the validity of national security
interests as essential to accomplishing its mission to protect other human
rights that fell within its jurisdiction. However, as expanded upon infra, the
CJEU operates off an implicit assumption that human rights operate

Free Movement of Such Data, art. 45 (Jan. 25, 2012), http://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012PC0011&from=EN
[http://perma.cc/4ZY8-82A4.
131 Robert Levine, Behind the European Privacy Ruling That's Confounding Silicon Valley,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/ll/business/international/
behind-the-european-privacy-ruling-thats-confounding-silicon-valley.html.
132
Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm'r, 2005 E.C.R. I-627,
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/ application/pdf/2015-10/ cp 150117en. pdf.
133 Natalia Drozdiak & Sam Schechner, EU Court Says Data-Transfer Pact With U.S.
Violates Privacy, WALL STREET J., (Oct. 6, 2015 1:42 P.M.), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/eu-court-strikes-down-trans-atlantic-safe-harbor-data-transfer-pact1444121361.
134 Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm'r, 2015 E.C.R. I-31-32.
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unilaterally in the privacy security tradeoff. 135 It also assumes the CJEU' s right
to give precedence to the CJEU' s preferred balance point vis-a-vis other
sovereign states. This assumption seemingly contradicts the CJEU' s explicit
finding that
In a democratic society, a balance must be struck between these
competing concerns, interests and values. Not every State will strike
the same balance. One will place a greater emphasis on the right to
privacy and one will place a greater emphasis on the requirements
of national security. It is important to state that it is not the function of

this court to assess, still less resolve, the relative merits of these positions. 136

In light of the CJEU' s stated position on the limited roles of the courts, the
Court's decision was quite remarkable. Nevertheless, CJEU's resolution of
"the relative merits of these [privacy tradeoff] positions" has created tensions
with the privacy-security balances employed in other states' intelligence
practices.
In addition to direct judicial review of national security data sharing
arrangements, the European Union has also conditioned cross-border data
sharing on its review of, among other factors, a non-EU country's national
security practices. 137 Thus far, Andorra, Argentina, the Faroe Islands,
Guernsey, Israel, the Isle of Man, Japan, Jersey, New Zealand, Switzerland and
Uruguay have received adequacy decisions, 138 and both Canada and the

135

See discussion infra Part IV.

Case 2016 No. 4809 P., Data Prot. Comm'r v. Facebook Ireland Limited &
Maximillian Schrems, §47 (Oct. 3, 2017), http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/sh2/
HCJ.pdf (emphasis added).
137 See Resolution of 6 April 2017 on the adequacy of the protection afforded by the
EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, EUR. P ARL. Doc. 2016/3018 'II 20 (RSP),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML +TA+P8TA-2017-0131 +0+DOC+PDF+ VO//EN. Interview with Iain Bourne, Group Manager Parliamentary and Government Affairs Department, United Kingdom Information
Commissioner's Office (Aug. 1, 2017) (notes on file with author).
138 European Union Comm.: 3rd Report of Session 2017-19, Brexit: The EU Data
Protection Package, HOUSE OF LORDS §67 (2017) https://publications.parliament.uk/
pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/7/7.pdf; see also Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data
in non-EU Countries, EUROPEAN COMM., https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-andfundamental-rights/data-protection/data-transfers-outside-eu/adequacy-protectionpersonal-data-non-eu-countries_en; HM Gov'T, supra note 65, at 'II 37.
136
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United States have received "partial" adequacy decisions. 139 By leveraging the
stick of forbidding corporate-to-corporate cross-border information sharing,
the CJEU has been able to exercise a powerful de facto influence on U.S.
intelligence practices, and a significant barrier to intelligence sharing to the
extent that the U.S. refuses to amend its practices. 140 As one European legal
scholar described this success, "It is no exaggeration to state that in future,
transnational privacy law will not be written in Brussels, but in in
Luxembourg." 141 For example, in order to achieve the new US-EU Privacy
Shield agreement, the United States has assigned a State Department official
to serve as an Ombudsperson charged with the role of serving as the point of
contact for foreign governments to raise concerns regarding US signals
intelligence activities. 142
The Ombudsperson also collaborates with
independent oversight bodies in the US government like the Inspectors
139 Canada has a partial adequacy with respect to only commercial organizations
subject to the PIPED Act, and the United States has an adequacy decision for
organizations certified under the Privacy Shield only. Id.
140 Alexander Garrelfs, GDPR Top Ten: #3 Extraterritorial Applicability Of The GDPR,
DELOITTE, Apr. 3, 2017, https://www2.deloitte.com/nl/nl/pages/risk/articles/gdpr-topten-3-extraterritorial-applicability-of-the-gdpr.html. Even if one were to contest that
the regulations only apply to those operating in EU jurisdiction negate the
extraterritorial reach, the de facto extraterritorial imposition still applies. See, e.g.,
Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International
Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 78 (2000) ("Most
importantly, once U.S. businesses adopt internal data privacy policies to avoid EU
transfer restrictions, they subject themselves to potential FTC enforcement proceedings
for failure to comply with proclaimed policies. In any case, it will be pragmatically
difficult for businesses to employ two sets of data privacy practices, one for EU
residents (providing for greater privacy protection) and one for U.S. residents
(providing for less."). Thomas Wischmeyer, Faraway, So Close!' - A Constitutional
Perspective on Transatlantic Data Flow Regulation, in OBAMA'S COURT: RECENT CHANGES
IN U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE (Anna-Bettina Kaiser,
Niels Petersen & Johannes Saurer eds.) 14 (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2877548
("Moreover, the CJEU' s strict scrutiny standard from Schrems coupled with the
extraterritorial scope of EU privacy law established in Google Spain amount to a defacto implementation of EU law on non-EU actors, in particular private actors based in
the U.S.").
141 Wischmeyer, supra note 140.
142 EU - U.S. Privacy Shield Ombudsperson, U.S. DEP'T STATE, https://www.state.gov/
e/privacyshield/ombud.
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General to ensure that appropriate safeguards and procedures are in place. 143
This Privacy Shield, a creature of compromise, 144 is now under attack as
privacy activists hope to use litigation to further heighten U.S. intelligence
safeguards. 145 As illustrated through the Privacy Shield example, European
judicial oversight poses the challenge of holding foreign government
intelligence agencies to a privacy-security tradeoff different than the one that
they have traditionally chosen.146
However, the United States is not entirely blameless in this regard. The
CJEU Schrems decision responded to the United States' jurisprudence on the
Fourth Amendment's inapplicability to non-U.S. citizens located outside of
United States territory. 147 The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the
Fourth Amendment does not "restrain the actions of the Federal Government
against aliens outside of the United States territory." 148 In other words, when

143

Id.

144 See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.5. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and
Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1967 (2013) (arguing that privacy "policymaking has
not been led exclusively by the EU, but has been a collaborative effort marked by
accommodation and compromise."); Maria Tzanou, The War against Terror and
Transatlantic Information Sharing: Spillovers of Privacy or Spillovers of Security, 31 UTRECHT
J. INT'L & EUR. L. 87 (2015) (arguing that EU-US privacy agreement might not actually
have the privacy forcing effect on the United States that many analysts suggest).
145 Second Legal Challenge Launched Against "Privacy Shield", ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO.
CENTER, Nov. 3, 2016, https://epic.org/2016/11/second-legal-challenge-launche.html.
146 However, these changes in privacy-security balance may have thus far been
mostly cosmetic. Maria Tzanou's assessment of EU data sharing agreements with the
U.S. suggest that in practice, the United States has drawn the EU towards the security
end of the privacy-security tradeoff without conceding any security powers. Tzanou,
supra note 144, at 95 ("While potential 'spillovers of privacy' are not visible yet,
'spillovers of security' looking in the opposite direction, are certainly here.").
147 See generally Wischmeyer, supra note 140, at 4.
148 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990). One must however
note the irony that the justification for the decision rested in part on a need for
international comity: "For better or for worse, we live in a world of nation-states in
which our Government must be able to "functio[n] effectively in the company of
sovereign nations." ... Some who violate our laws may live outside our borders under
a regime quite different from that which obtains in this country. Situations threatening
to important American interests may arise half-way around the globe, situations which
... [require cooperation] through diplomatic understanding, treaty, or legislation." Id.
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it comes to foreign nationals located abroad, the United States' privacysecurity tradeoff determines that for intelligence purposes, foreigners do not
receive any privacy protection. This lack of constitutional procedural
protection has culminated in foreign opposition to United States' Upstream
surveillance practices authorized under Section 702 of the FISA Amendment
Act of 2008. 149 The Amendment eliminated the previous statutory warrant and
probable cause requirements for the collection of electronic communication by
non-United States persons located extraterritorially. 150 The § 702 standard
requires joint authorization by the Attorney General and the Director of the
National Intelligence with a showing that the targets are "reasonably believed
to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence
information." 151 The Upstream collection physically taps the fiber-optic cables
responsible for data traffic, and enables bulk communication interception. 152
at 275. See also Wischmeyer, supra note 140, at 7 (discussing Verdugo-Urquidez effects);
see discussion supra note 96 (detailing recent §702 jurisprudence).
149 Daskal, supra note 62, at 346.
150 Id. In contrast, the Act retains explicit due process safeguards for United States
citizens. See Matt Olsen, "Fixes" to Surveillance Law Could Severely Harm FBI National
Security Investigations, JUST SEC. (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/47349/
section-702-privacy-surveillance-law-severely-harm-fbi-national-securityinvestigations. However, there are still concerns of incidental collection of U.S.
persons' communications. See Elizabeth Goitein, Closing Section 702 's Front-Door Search
Loophole: A Critical Protection for Americans, JUST SEC. (Oct. 24, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/46239I closing-section-702s-front-door-search-loopholecri tical-protection-americans. Additionally, the Open Technology Institute has
carefully documented the public record of FISA Section 702 compliance violations.
Robyn Greene, A History of FISA Section 702 Compliance Violations, NEW AM.: OPEN
TECH. INST. (Sep. 28, 2017), https://www.newamerica.org/oti/blog/history-fisa-section702-compliance-violations/#. But see PRIVACY & CL. OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 2 (2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/702Report.pdf (providing, in relevant part, that "[o]peration of the Section 702 program
has been subject to judicial oversight and extensive internal supervision, and the Board
has found no evidence of intentional abuse.").
151 Daskal, supra note 62, at 346.
152 Scarlet Kim, How Bulk Interception Works, PRIVACY INT'L (Sep. 30, 2016),
https://medium.com/privacy-international/how-bulk-interception-worksd645440ff6bd; see also Daskal, supra note 62, at 349 ("Whereas collection through the
PRISM program is done with the assistance of the ISP or phone service providers with
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While in the past, Upstream collection included "to, from or about"
information about a Section 702 Selector, beginning in May 2017, the Upstream
collection only intercepted "to or from" communication data. 153 This
interception capability takes advantage of the United States' domestic access
control over Internet infrastructure, 154 and may set a precedential model for
other states to engage in similar fiber-optics tapping practices. 155 Of note,
despite the CJEU' s condemnation of U.S. intelligence gathering practices, it is
not clear that European governments provide greater safeguards against
foreign government surveillance. 156 Other practices notwithstanding, the
balance struck by U.S. government surveillance plays an outsized role given
the effective control that U.S. companies exert over vast swaths of the
lnternet. 157 When the United States intelligence agencies need information,

whom the target interacts, "upstream" collection is done with the assistance of the
Internet and telecommunications companies that control the fiber-optic cables over
which a target's communications travel."); Ashley Gorski & Patrick Toomey,
Unprecedented and Unlawful: The NSA's 'Upstream' Surveillance, AM. CL. UNION (Sep.
23, 2016 ),
https://www .aclu.org/blog/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/
unprecedented-and-unlawful-nsas-upstream (describing Upstream and accompanying concerns).
153 NSA Stops Certain Section 702 "Upstream" Activities, NAT'L SEC. AGENCY: CENTRAL
SEC. SERV., Apr. 28, 2017, https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/press-room/statements/
2017-04-28-702-statement.shtml.
154 See Kim, supra note 152 ("The geographic location of the US features a high
concentration of cables emanating from its east and west coasts."); Ian Brown, The
Feasibility Of Transatlantic Privacy-Protective Standards For Surveillance, 23 INT'L J. L. &
INFO. TECH. 23, 29 (2014), https://academic.oup.com/ijlit/article/23/1/23/2907405 ("USA
is reluctant to accept limitations on its abilities to monitor data and communications
relating to non-US persons that physically transit US territory-which NSA Director
Keith Alexander has called a huge 'home-field advantage'.").
155 See Daskal, supra note 50, at 474 ("The approach taken by the United States is likely
to become a model for others, thus providing the United States a unique opportunity
to set the standards.").
156 See Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 250; see also Deeks, supra note 51, at 332 (detailing
bulk collection practices in the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, and France).
157 Daskal, supra note 50, at 474 ("While the problem of cross-border access to data is
inherently international, the United States has an outsized role to play, given a
combination of the U.S.-based provider dominance of the market"); Rubinstein et al.,
supra note 30, at 118 (stating, in relevant part, that "[t]he USA is perceived as having
unique advantages in [transborder surveillance].").
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they can (with the appropriate domestic safeguards) utilize the information in
question. As viewed by non-Americans, U.S. hegemony over Internet services
allows for intrusions by the United States government, irrespective of
domestic national privacy protections. 158 While the United States has stated
that it is undeterred by the possible consequences of its unchecked § 702
collection, 159 in practice, the US has taken steps to regulate its collection of
foreign intelligence to account for privacy interests of those located abroad. 160

See, e.g., Brief for Appellate at 8, In the Matter of A Warrant To Search A Certain
E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained By Microsoft Corporation. Microsoft Corp.
v. United States (2014) (No. 14-2985-cv.), 2014 WL 7277561, at *8 ("European citizens
are highly sensitive to the differences between European and U.S. standards on data
protection. Such concerns are frequently raised in relation to the regulation of crossborder data flows and the mass-processing of data by U.S. technology companies. The
successful execution of the warrant at issue in this case would extend the scope of this
anxiety to a sizeable majority of the data held in the world's datacenters outside the
U.S. (most of which are controlled by U.S. corporations) and would thus undermine
the protections of the EU data protection regime, even for data belonging to an EU
citizen and stored in an EU country."). See also Farhad Manjoo, Why The World Is
Drawing Battle Lines Against American Tech Giants, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 1, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/02/technology/why-the-world-is-drawing-battlelines-against-american-tech-giants.html; Internet Firms Face A Global Techlash,
ECONOMIST (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/international/21726072though-big-tech-firms-are-thriving-they-are-facing-more-scrutiny-ever-internet-firms
("Some governments are unsettled by the growing role in their national lives of firms
whose values are distinctively American, in particular in their commitment to free
speech ahead of privacy.").
159 Ahmed Ghappour, Searching Places Unknown: Law Enforcement Jurisdiction on the
Dark Web, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1130 (2017), https://review.law.stanford.edu/wpcontent/uploads/sites/3/2017/04/69-Stan-L-Rev-1075.pdf ("[T]he [U.S. Department of
Justice] has made it clear that it intends to use hacking techniques for all crimes,
regardless of the potential cross-border implications."). In late 2017 and early 2018, §
702 underwent a heated reauthorization debate in the USA Liberty Act. See, e.g., Olsen,
supra note 150 (defending "national security imperative" for full reauthorization). In
January 2018, Congress reauthorized FISA Section 702 for another six years. Ted
Barrett & Ashley Killough, Senate Passed FISA Section 702 Reauthorization, CNN (Jan. 18,
2018 ), https ://www.mn.com/2018/01/18/politics/fisa-reau thorization-senate-vote.
160 President Obama' s Presidential Policy Directive 28 added additional safeguards
for non-U.S. citizens located abroad and required that "signals intelligence activities
must take into account that all persons should be treated with dignity and respect[.]"
See PPD-28, supra note 96. But see Eric Manpearl, The Privacy Rights of Non-U.S. Persons
158

38

2019]

LEGALIZING INTELLIGENCE SHARING

In short, the European Courts have taken steps to govern the intelligence
sharing practices of not only the European Union Member States, but also their
intelligence partners. This jurisprudence catches other states in a bind; states
have their historical privacy-security tradeoff on one hand, and a legitimate
need to engage in intelligence sharing with EU member states as well.
Moreover, the United States' lack of extraterritorial privacy protection has
further aggravated these barriers to intelligence sharing. The United States'
legal stance, that the privacy-security considerations grant no privacy
protections to foreigners located abroad, has generated understandable
discomfort among partnering countries. In particular, foreign onlookers fear
that the dissonance between domestic and foreign surveillance protections can
facilitate a "revolving door" method by which their own intelligence services
may partner with the United States to circumvent national limitations on
domestic surveillance.161
The EU Court's approach to intelligence governance leads the EU to strike
a particular privacy-security tradeoff for cross-border intelligence sharing.
Privacy rights do not dissolve in the face of security; as the famous quote
attributed to Benjamin Franklin goes, "Those who would give up essential
Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor
Safety." 162 However, the human rights interests weigh on both sides of the
scale-too much privacy jeopardizes the human right to life and security. The
European Courts have approached intelligence sharing with a privacy
idealism that has infused their jurisprudence, but has met practical resistance
by security apparatuses, including within EU member states. 163 Unless
in Signals Intelligence, 29 FL. J. INT'L L. 303 (2017) https://heinonline.org/
HOL/P?h=hein.journals/fjil29&i=323 (arguing that "the United States should rescind
PPD-28's expansion of privacy protections to non-U.S. persons because of its cost to
U.S. intelligence capabilities, which are critical to protecting U.S. national security
interests, the American people, and the U.S. Homeland.").
161 See, e.g., Kim et al., supra note 8.
162 Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to the Governor, in VOTES AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1755-1756 (1756),
http://franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp?vol=6&page=238a.
163 See, e.g., Lorna Woods, Transferring Personal Data Outside the EU: Clarification from
the EC]?, EU L. ANALYSIS (Aug. 4, 2017), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2017/08/
transferring-personal-data-outside-eu.html; New Privacy International report shows that
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European law enforcement and intelligence partners comport with the
requisite privacy data collection and data sharing standards, Europe may not
be able to lawfully access or utilize the proffered foreign intelligence. As such,
this standard has the potential to undermine Europe's effectiveness in
receiving foreign information. It also undermines the national security of
European partners who may no longer have the ability to share European
intelligence. 164 Below, this Article tackles the challenge of designing criteria
by which states may share intelligence with agencies that may strike a
different privacy balance yet still ensuring the legitimate safeguarding of
privacy interests.

V.

ADOPTING CRITERIA FOR
GOVERNMENT
INTELLIGENCE SHARING

A. International Law Governing Intelligence Sharing

As Professor Ashley Deeks recognizes, when it comes to international law and
the intelligence landscape, "few guideposts exist on how to proceed." 165
Professor Michael Reisman and James Baker have suggested that "the legality
of any proactive covert operation should be tested by whether it promotes the
basic policy objectives of the Charter, for example, self-determination;
whether it adds to or detracts from minimum world order; whether it is
consistent with contingencies authorizing the overt use of force; and whether
covert coercion was implemented only after plausibly less coercive measures

21 European countries are unlawfully retaining personal data,

PRIVACY INT'L (Oct. 23, 2017),
https://www.privacyinternational.org/press-release/52/new-privacy-internationalreport-shows-21-european-countries-are-unlawfully; Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 253
(noting that the European Council of Ministers have spent years resisting "efforts to
put EU privacy-protective legislation on a firmer footing.").
164 Assuming that leaving the threat to national security unchecked is not a viable
option, then the absence of foreign intelligence sharing will likely lead to increased
surveillance of foreigners by European governments.
165 Deeks, supra note 63, at 667. See also BORN ET AL., supra note 4, at 70 (stating that
"relatively few countries have legislation on strategic surveillance and the
jurisprudence of international courts is sparse.").
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were tried." 166 Reisman and Baker's operational approach, while practically
oriented, has received criticism for granting almost "unfettered discretion" to
the state analyzing the issue. 167
Some legal scholars have sought to find an international human right to
privacy in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
an international treaty with 169 parties. 168 Article 2(1) of the ICCPR requires:
"Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status." 169 However, the United States
has consistently taken the position that the ICCPR does not apply
extraterritorially, 170

and

state

practice

demonstrates

"few,

any"

if

extraterritorial privacy protections against intelligence surveillance.
As
Asaf Lubin notes: "Despite this prevalent state practice, U.N. experts, human
171

rights treaty bodies, and privacy NGOs have been adamant about protecting
the myth of a singular and universal right to privacy. By doing so, they seem
to 'abet the deception, avoiding the truth like someone pulling blankets over
his head to avoid the cold reality of dawn."' 172 Other scholars have identified

166

W. MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMES E. BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACTION: PRACTICES,
CONTEXTS, AND POLICIES OF COVERT COERCION ABROAD IN INTERNATIONAL AND
AMERICAN LAW 26-27 (1992).
167 Deeks, supra note 63, at 668.
168 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR], https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1976/03/19760323%200617%20AM/Ch_IV_04.pdf.
169 Id. at art. 2, 'II 1.
170 See, e.g., U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1405th mtg., 'II 20, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/SR.1405 (Mar. 31, 1995) (statement of Conrad Harper, Legal Advisor, U.S.
Dep't of State) ("The Covenant was not regarded as having extraterritorial application .
. . . During the negotiating history, the words 'within its territory' had been debated
and were added by vote, with the clear understanding that such wording would limit
the obligations to within a Party's territory.").
171 Lubin, supra note 51, at 551.
172 Id. at 515 (citing W. Michael Reisman, Myth System and Operational Code, 3 YALE
STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 229, 237 (1977)). To take a few recent examples, see, e.g., ANA
VANESSA MIRANDA ANTUNES DA SILVA, ENHANCING SURVEILLANCE THROUGH THE
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that even if one accepts that the ICCPR has extraterritorial effect, Article 17 of
the ICCPR does not create an absolute limitation on intrusion, but rather only
forbids "arbitrary or unlawful interference." 173 As a result, despite the ardent
advocacy, most scholars agree that as a practical matter, United States
opposition and state practice do not provide a viable implementation of
universal privacy rights on the basis of the ICCPR.174
PATRIOT ACT AND THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE AMENDMENT ACT, AND
THEIR IMP ACT ON CIVIL LIBERTIES: CAN HUMAN SECURITY BE COMPROMISED BY
SECURITIZATION? 138 (2014), https://repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt/bitstream/1822/
33875/l/Ana%20Vanessa%20Miranda%20Antunes%20da%20Silva.pdf ("[T]here is an
increasing perception, not only but particularly in the EU, that the international human
rights law applies extraterritorially and should be respected in order to abide by these
international obligations."); Bignami & Resta, supra note 97, at 1 ("[Privacy] is a
fundamental right enjoyed by all members of the human community and deserving of
respect by all states whenever they act on their territory or enjoy "effective control"
over persons."); Eliza Watt, The Right To Privacy And The Future Of Mass Surveillance, 21
INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 773, 776 (2017) ("Article 17 ICCPR and Article 8 ECHR apply
extraterritorially, which means that states must respect the right to privacy whenever
individuals are within their territory as well as their jurisdiction."). The U.N. General
Assembly also adopted consensus resolution, G.A. Res. 68/167, 'II 3 (Dec. 18, 2013),
which "[a]ffirms that the same rights that people have offline must also be protected
online, including the right to privacy." However, the U.S., which joined the resolution,
issued an explanation reiterating that the ICCPR does not apply extraterritorially. U.S.
Envoy at U.N., Explanation of Position on Draft Resolution L.26/Rev. 1 The Right to
Privacy in the Digital Age (Nov. 25, 2014) (cited in Deeks, supra note 51, at 334).
173 ICCPR, supra note 168, at art. 17. See also Bignami & Resta, supra note 97, at 6 ("The
wording of Article 17 of the ICCPR makes clear that privacy is only protected against
"unlawful" and "arbitrary" interferences."); Peter Margulies, The NSA in Global
Perspective: Surveillance, Human Rights, and International Counterterrorism, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2137, 2138 (2014), http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=4980&context=flr ("This Article takes a middle ground that acknowledges that
the United States has an extraterritorial duty under Article 2(1) to "respect" ICCPR
rights including privacy, but then construes Article 17's prohibition on arbitrary
interference narrowly to permit NSA surveillance abroad, given the legal constraints
already in place governing the NSA's efforts."); Deeks, supra note 51, at 307 ("The
Commentary to the ICCPR does indicate, however, that when states were negotiating
Article 17, they understood the prohibition on "unlawful" or "arbitrary" interference
to refer to acts that conflicted with the state's domestic legal system (which tends to
run with the state's territory).").
174 See Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 254 ("For these reasons, privacy advocates are
right not to place all hopes on the broad jurisprudence of international human rights.")
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International law governing state sovereignty might also seem to prevent
foreign intelligence collection and its subsequent sharing. As Bert-Jaaps Koop
and Morag Goodwin contend,
In the strict-and still dominant-interpretation of international
law, any evidence-gathering activity in a foreign state, including the
making of a mere phone call, can be considered a breach of state
sovereignty. Accessing data that is, or later turns out to be, stored
on a server located in the territory of another state, without the prior
consent of that state, constitutes a breach of the territorial integrity
of that state and thus a wrongful act. 175

In other words, according to Koop and Goodwin, non-consensual intelligence
gathering violates the international legal principle of state territorial integrity.
The authors point to Article 19 of the Cybercrime Convention, which provides
that extended computer network searches should not cross national borders
in the absence of two circumstances outlined in Article 32: a) lawful and
voluntary consent from foreign actors, or b) if the targeted information is
publicly available. 176 If states violated international law in collecting shared
intelligence, then one might consider international law to forbid any
subsequent use of the information.
Koops and Goodwin's point notwithstanding, further case law developed
by the rights-protective European Court of Human Rights may have cabined
the effect of international law limitations for cross-border computer searches.
In Weber and Saravia v. Germany, the Plaintiffs charged Germany's Federal
Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst) with the interception of
telecommunications and the subsequent use of personal data. 177 The Court
took important notice of the fact that while the data may have been relayed
from foreign countries, the devices used to monitor the wireless

Koops & Goodwin, supra note 32, at 9.
Id. at 53 (citing Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, C.E.T.S. 185). A similar
provision is included in article 40 of the League of Arab States' Arab Convention on
Combating Information Technology Offences (available at https://cms.unov.org/
DocumentReposi tory Indexer/GetDodnOriginalF ormat. drsx ?DocID=3dbe778b-7b3a4af0-95ce-a8bbd1ecd6dd ).
177 Weber & Saravia v. Germany, App No 54934/00, 2006-XI [2006] Eur. Ct. H.R. 1173,
Admissibility (2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/001-76586.
175
176
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communications were situated in sovereign German territory. 178 In doing so,
the Court held that this German interception did not constitute conduct
"which interfered with the territorial sovereignty of foreign States as protected
in public international law." 179 Under parallel reasoning, a state would not
interfere with the territorial sovereignty of any foreign state as long as that
state accessed the wireless Internet data from a computer located in its own
country. Additionally, in contrast to criminal evidence collection, foreign
intelligence gathering constitutes acts of espionage.

When it comes to

espionage,
one can identify scores of sources in international law to establish the
existence of the ]us Ad Explorationem (the Right to Spy). So much so,
in fact, that "to claim that espionage is not a priori permissible as a
sovereign prerogative is simply inconceivable in our public world
order" and certainly in discontent with both vast bodies law and
practice. 180

As such, state sovereignty does not provide a barrier to intelligence gathering
under international law. Therefore, the subsequent intelligence sharing does
not constitute 'fruit of the poisonous tree.'
Finally, at least one court-the European Court of Human Rights-has
tied the international law principles governing surveillance and intelligence
gathering to intelligence sharing. In Liberty v UK, the ECtHR held that the
privacy safeguards on intelligence data must detail the "procedure to be
followed for selecting for examination, sharing, storing and destroying
intercepted material." 181 In the absence of conflicting jurisprudence, the
ECtHR case law makes a plausible contention that any international law

Id. at 'II 86 ("The Court observes that the impugned provisions of the amended G
10 Act authorise the monitoring of international wireless telecommunications, that is,
telecommunications which are not effected via fixed telephone lines but, for example,
via satellite or radio relay links, and the use of data thus obtained. Signals emitted
from foreign countries are monitored by interception sites situated on German soil and
the data collected are used in Germany.").
179 Id.
180 Asaf Lubin, The Dragon-Kings Restraint: Proposing a Compromise for the EEZ
Surveillance Conundrum, 57 WASHBURN L. J. 17, 56 (2018).
181 Liberty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment (July 1,
2008), § 69, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=OOl-87207 (emphasis added).
178
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governing intelligence collection mandates some privacy consideration in
intra-governmental intelligence sharing.
B. Scholarship on Intelligence Governance Frameworks

The legal field has proliferated substantial writing on international
intelligence bodies and covert operations, but far less attention has been paid
to intelligence sharing.

Some of the classic literature recognizes the

importance of data sharing but does not address the challenges arising from
various privacy regimes. For example, work by Professors Myres McDougal,
Harold Lasswell and Michael Reisman note the importance of intelligence
sharing across governments: "The model of Interpol may be simulated by
'lnterspy,' a service that draws upon the sources available to all organizations
willing and able to work together to expose threats to world public order." 182
While McDougal et al recognize the importance of intelligence sharing, 183 they
do not address the differences in privacy-security balances. 184 Over the past
few decades, with what Professor Margo Schlanger has recognized a rise of
"intelligence legalism," legal scholarship has taken a renewed interest
between law and the intelligence community. 185

Much of the effort has

focused on MLAT reform, which grapples with the more circumscribed
problem of obstruction in law enforcement data sharing requests. 186 Other
McDougal et al., supra note 44, at 447.
Id. at 422 ("As global interdependence increases, this imbalance will ultimately
prove to be detrimental to planning on the part of even the most developed
communities, and will give greater impetus to the sharing of processing technology.").
182
183

184

Id.

Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency's Civil
Liberties Gap, 6 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 112, 113 (2015).
186 See Jennifer Daskal & Andrew Keane Woods, Cross-Border Data Requests: A
Proposed Framework, LAWFARE (Nov. 24, 2015, 8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
cross-border-data-requests-proposed-framework; see also Daskal, supra note 50; Daskal,
supra note 62, at 393 ("these concerns highlight the need for new cross-border
185

mechanisms that facilitate law enforcement access to data, yet also respect the
sovereign interest in setting privacy protections and controlling law enforcement
operations within one's jurisdiction."); ANDREW K. WOODS, DATA BEYOND BORDERS:
MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE INTERNET AGE (2015),
https ://globalnetworkini tiati ve .org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/GNI-MLATReport. pdf; MICHAEL CHERTOFF & PAUL ROSENZWEIG, A PRIMER ON GLOBALLY
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proposals tackle "government data collection" with a broad scope and do not
clarify whether they intend their proposals to address the MLAT process or
also include government intelligence sharing. 187
Inter-governmental data-sharing regimes have been woefully undertheorized by the legal literature. 188 Nearly all the work focuses on domestic
privacy governance over the home regime and does not seriously engage with
the question of harmonizing the different privacy-security tradeoffs for
intelligence sharing between allied governments. Instead, the goal is to
regulate the surveillance practices of each country, so a uniform sharing

HARMONIZING INTERNET JURISDICTION AND REGULATIONS (Global Comm'n on Internet
Gov., Paper No. 10 2015), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/gcig_paper
_nolO_O.pdf; Peter Swire & Justin Hemmings, Stakeholders in Reform of the Global System
for Mutual Legal Assistance, in BULK COLLECTION: SYSTEMATIC GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO
PRIVATE-SECTOR DATA (Fred H. Cate & James X. Dempsey eds., 2017),
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2696163; Jonah Force Hill, Problematic Alternatives: MLA T
Reform for the Digital Age, HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. ONLINE (Jan. 28, 2015),
http://harvardnsj.org/2015/01/problematic-alternati ves-mlat-reform-for-the-digi talage; Gail Kent, Sharing Investigation Specific Data with Law Enforcement-An
International Approach (Feb. 14, 2014) (Stanford Pub. L. working paper),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2472413. For a useful overview of the current status of UKUK MLAT negotiations as well as some of the remaining concerns, see Tiffany Lin &
Mailyn Fidler, Cross-Border Data Access Reform: A Primer on the Proposed U.S.-U.K.
Agreement (Berkman Klein Center Research Pub. No. 2017-7, 2017),
https://ssrn.com/ abstract=3035563.
187 See, e.g., Microsoft Corporate Blog, Time For An International Convention On
Government Access To Data, MICROSOFT (Jan. 20, 2014), https://blogs.microsoft.com/onthe-issues/2014/01/20/time-for-an-international-convention-on-government-access-todata (writing generally about "government access to data"). However, given
Microsoft's well-documented challenges navigating conflicts over compelled data
disclosures, see United States v. Microsoft Corp., SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/united-states-v-microsoft-corp, one may
reasonably assume that the Microsoft's principle concern centers on government access
to data stored by private companies, not exchanged with foreign intelligence agencies.
188 Rubinstein et al., supra note 30, at 105 ("Although most of the countries appear to
consider multinational access and sharing essential to national security and law
enforcement activities, these arrangements received relatively little attention in the
papers that were commissioned. Overall, it seems, there has been relatively little
discussion of the complex legal and political issues associated with asserting
jurisdiction over data stored in other countries or relating to citizens of other
countries.").
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standard is often assumed. Professor Peter Margulies' article presents an
exception to this rule; while Margulies does not consider intelligence sharing,
he envisions complementarity providing procedural pluralism to legitimate
differing state surveillance practices under international law. 189 More typical
is the stance epitomized by Edward Snowden supporters, who have clamored
for the introduction of a "Snowden Treaty," which calls to outlaw mass
surveillance and create whistleblower protections.190
Some scholars and human rights groups have sought to forge limiting
principles conjured from international human rights law. Rubinstein et al have
sought to design a privacy framework directly based on the principles
governing surveillance (for law enforcement and intelligence gathering)
extrapolated from the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, 191 and
suggest fourteen principles from the ECtHR. 192 However, the Rubinstein
analysis does not directly consider intelligence sharing with foreign
governments. Similarly, privacy activist group Necessary & Proportionate
has outlined thirteen principles that they believe provide the international
human rights law standards for government communications surveillance. 193
While at first blush, one of the principles, safeguards for international
cooperation, seems to cover the subject of this inquiry-intelligence sharing,
it entirely elides the issue. The principle discusses international cooperation
within the context of MLATs.

MLATs are used only for criminal

Margulies, supra note 173, at 2157 ("A state could choose from a number of
procedural options that would accomplish these goals, without being locked into
specific measures that might not fit with that state's history or traditions. Procedural
pluralism would also minimize conflicts with other international rules, such as the law
of armed conflict and Security Council resolutions mandating counterterrorism
efforts.").
190 What is the Snowden Treaty, SNOWDEN TREATY, http://www.snowdentreaty.org; The
189

Snowden Treaty: A new International Treaty on the Right to Privacy, Protection Against
Improper Surveillance and Protection of Whistleblowers, SNOWDEN TREATY,
http://media.wix.com/ugd/fb845b_89e20fe385844f348fbc79a6ede39a4d.pdf.
191 Rubinstein et al., supra note 30, at 111.

Id.
Necessary and Proportionate: International Principles On The Application Of Human
Rights To Communications Surveillance, NECESSARY & PROPORTIONATE COALITION (May
192
193

2014), https://necessaryandproportionate.org/principles.
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investigations, and do not cover intelligence sharing. 194 It is possible that
Necessary & Proportionate have implicitly adopted the position that
intelligence sharing should fall within the MLAT framework, although this
delivers a strained reading given MLATs' traditional scope. Finally, President
Obama' s Presidential Policy Directive 28 establishing voluntary minimum
protections for foreigners during government intelligence activities has
introduced another helpful framework, as the protections outlined in PPD-28
benefited from the insight of the real security needs that government
intelligence seeks to address. 195 However, the PPD-28 framework is
incomplete, both in its lack of legal discussion and lack of detail.
The few works that do directly consider inter-governmental intelligence
sharing almost unfailingly adopt a tunnel vision towards only the "privacy"
elements of the privacy-security tradeoff. 196 Take, for example, Eliza Watt's
effort supporting the proposed Intelligence Codex for the Council of Europe. 197
David Cole and Federico Fabbrini argue for a comprehensive transatlantic
privacy between the EU and US that would close the protection gap endemic
in the lack of extraterritorial privacy protection under each jurisdiction. 198 Ian
Brown et al undertakes the project to outline "privacy-conscious intelligence
reform," and proposes a series of standards, but do not actually consider

194 Greg Nojeim, MLAT Reform: A Straw Man Proposal, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH.
(Sep. 3, 2015), https://cdt.org/insight/mlat-reform-a-straw-man-proposal.
195 PPD-28, supra note 96 (committing to 1) proportionality, 2) use, dissemination, and
retention limitations 3) data security and accuracy protections 4) oversight
procedures.).
196 See Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 253 ("[T]he international law scholarship, even on
its own terms, is often incomplete, because much of it is framed in terms applicable
only to ordinary law enforcement, without taking on board the extra flexibility and
secrecy that is arguably "necessary in a democratic society" in the case of surveillance
for national security purposes.").
197 Watt, supra note 172, at 784 ("There can be no doubt that a binding treaty, such as
the proposed Codex, is necessary."). The Council of Europe suggested four principles
to govern intra-European intelligence cooperation: 1) prohibition on mutual political
and economic espionage; 2) foreign intelligence activity must receive ex ante approval
from the target state; 3) prohibition on tracking, analyzing, or storing data without
individualized suspicion from a friendly state, and 4) prohibition on compelled
disclosures from telecommunication and internet companies without a court order. Id.
19s Cole & Fabbrini, supra note 30, at 223.
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Privacy International' s recent call for greater

transparency over government intelligence sharing reflects the renewed
interest in bringing law into the shadowy sphere of government intelligence,
but the privacy advocacy group does not suggest a framework for intelligence
governance beyond public transparency. 200
Professor Stephen Schulhofer rejects "the developing consensus" that a
comprehensive multilateral agreement to abide by surveillance principles or
minimum standards would help regulate expansive state surveillance
activity. 201 Instead, Schulhofer argues that a "privacy-conscious international
framework" would allow "the fox to design th[e] henhouse," and his "ultimate
concern [] for privacy and democracy worldwide" leads him to reject an
agreement that would almost inevitably lead to an arrangement at less than
maximal privacy. 202 Instead, Schulhofer promotes bilateral commitment in
which each party grants whichever safeguards it observes when engaging in
surveillance over its own citizens. 203
Schulhofer is right. A multinational arrangement would necessarily result
in less privacy safeguards than required for national security activity in the
maximally protective states. But from here we differ. Unlike Schulhofer, I
reject the premise that privacy rights are the only rights at play here and

Ian Brown et al., Towards Multilateral Standards for Surveillance Reform (Jan. 5,
2015) (Oxford Internet Institute Discussion Paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2551164
(outlining standards of 1) legitimate national security purposes for surveillance, 2)
establishment of extraterritorial privacy standards, 3) tailored limitations on data
collection beyond a broad "relevant to national security interest," 4) minimization
standards, 5) methods of oversight, 6) protection against unauthorized access.). Their
closest standard is "onward transmission/purpose limitation," but this limitation refers
to alternative non-intelligence uses, not sharing with another intelligence agency. See
id. at 5-6. The paper also provides an excellent recap of some of the existing intelligence
reform proposals. Id. at 20-24.
200
Privacy International Launches International Campaign For Greater Transparency
Around Secretive Intelligence Sharing Activities Between Governments, PRIVACY INT'L (Oct.
23, 2017),
https ://www.privacyinternational.org/press-release/51/privacy-internationallaunches-international-campaign-greater-tr ansparency-around.
201
See Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 242.
202 Id.
203
Id. at 261.
199
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contend that security considerations also implicate human rights in a way that
justifies tailored departures for intelligence-sharing purposes. Security
officials are not the "fox in the henhouse," but rather serious stakeholders in a
privacy-security duet balancing competing human rights.
Ashley Deeks and Peter Margulies are possibly the only scholars who
have employed a true balance-oriented approach in designing an intelligencesharing framework. 204 However, both works only treat intelligence sharing as
an incidental measure to a state's domestic intelligence program. Deeks
recognizes that "[there is no] disagreement that the right to privacy is a
qualified right, subject to lawful and non-arbitrary interference by a state." 205
Instead, she suggests six "procedural norms" that would create meaningful
privacy protections without harming national security. 206 Deeks touches
briefly on intelligence sharing by recognizing that a preference for domestic
surveillance would help address the "revolving door" concern, and notes that
such a principle could increase the need for ongoing coordination among
/1

allies' intelligence agencies." 207 Similarly, Margulies offers a list of procedural
protections. 208 Like Deeks, Margulies recognizes that harmonizing standards
"could also remove any barriers to cooperation between the United States and
foreign states." 209

This Article goes further in providing a cooperation

Margulies, supra note 173, at 2157; Deeks, supra note 51, at 346.
Deeks, supra note 51, at 305. This is not to say that other frameworks do not
recognize that the privacy right is not absolute. To the contrary, they uniformly allow
for privacy intrusions in some circumstances. However, what distinguishes Deeks'
scholarship from the other works is an explicit recognition that the goal of the
framework should not be to achieve the maximum privacy protections possible.
206 Deeks, supra note 51, at 351-63 (the six procedural norms are 1) notice to public of
applicable rules, 2) limits on the reasons for data collection and use, 3) requirement for
periodic reviews, 4) limits on data retention, 5) preference for domestic surveillance,
and 6) neutral oversight body).
207 Id. at 366.
208
Margulies, supra note 173, at 2157. Margulies' procedural protections include 1)
notice about grounds for surveillance, 2) oversight of surveillance programs, 3)
deterrence of arbitrary official conduct, including targeting of political opponents or
disfavored ethnic, racial, or religious groups, and includes procedural flexibility for
state implementation. Id.
209 Id. at 2165.
204
205
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framework tailored to a thorough and detailed exploration of intergovernmental intelligence sharing.

C. Proposed Framework
As noted supra in Part 0, widespread disagreement persists over the relevant
international law governing intelligence sharing. This framework utilizes
commonly cited principles of international law as a helpful starting point.
Drawing on prior literature, I condense the fourteen international law
principles of government surveillance identified by Necessary &
Proportionate 210 into 5 primary categories: 1) principle of legality 2) principle
of safeguarding against abuse 3) principle of proportionality 4) principle of
transparency and oversight 5) principle of notification and remedies. In order
to tailor this framework to the challenges of intelligence sharing, I include
three additional considerations: 6) the principle of complementarity 7) the
principle of good faith and 8) the exigency exception. Using this framework,
I outline a way forward for governing intelligence sharing while respecting
legitimate differences in countries' privacy-security balance.
In devising a framework for governmental intelligence sharing, one
approach would be to adopt a highest common denominator and to use the
same standards to govern intelligence sharing as are used for law enforcement
sharing and other police activities. Some privacy rights advocates, including
Privacy International, have opted for this approach. 211 Such individuals can
point to American law, which grants the same Fourth Amendment privacy
protection to American citizens, regardless of whether the surveillance arises
in the context of petty crime or dire threats to national security. 212 As the U.S.
Supreme Court famously held in the Keith case, a government's national
security concerns do not justify departure in this case from the customary
Fourth Amendment requirement of judicial approval prior to initiation of a
/1

210 See Rubinstein et al., supra note 30, at 104 (condensing the fourteen necessary and
proportionate principles into thirteen categories).
211
See Brown, supra note 154, at 23-25 (conflating intelligence and law enforcement
privacy standards).
212
See infra note 218.
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search or surveillance." 213 However, as Professor Schulhofer notes, for many
democratic countries, "such fundamental issues as the required level of
suspicion, the role of suspect-specific judicial approval ex ante, and the degree
to which transparency and oversight are relaxed in the national security
context." 214
There are good reasons for differentiating intelligence and law
enforcement data collection.

For example, intelligence purposes may

fundamentally differ from those of law enforcement: "Intelligence often
searches for new information, whereas law enforcement often looks for
additional information." 215 This purposive difference reasonably leads to one
to expect different evidentiary standards-"probable cause" often poses a
prohibitively challenging standard when searching for new information.
Therefore, this paper rejects the notion that the same criminal law enforcement
information sharing standards should also apply to intelligence sharing.
"In the field of monitoring bilateral and multilateral intelligence sharing
arrangements, there has been particular inadequacy of oversight." 216 Thus far,
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has developed the most
comprehensive case law on surveillance. However, as the Court's name
suggests, the ECtHR "takes the community interest in the right to privacy and
the corresponding state duty to respect that community obligation very
seriously." 217 As such, it comes as little surprise that privacy advocates

See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 321
(1972) (holding government's national security concerns "do not justify departure in
this case from the customary Fourth Amendment requirement of judicial approval
prior to initiation of a search or surveillance.").
214 Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 245 ("There is wide variation, even among Western
democracies, on such fundamental issues as the required level of suspicion, the role of
suspect-specific judicial approval ex ante, and the degree to which transparency and
oversight are relaxed in the national security context.").
215 Mailyn Fidler, MLAT Reform: Some Thoughts From Civil Society, LAWFARE (Sep. 11,
2015 ), https ://www.lawfareblog.com/mlat-reform-some-thoughts-civil-society.
216
Lubin, supra note 51, at 548.
217
Bignami & Resta, supra note 97, at 2. Because the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) views privacy as a human right, its jurisprudence has found that "all
persons are covered and are guaranteed the same treatment by the state." Id. As noted
in Part VII.A, this interpretation is contested as a matter of international law.
213
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campaign for the ECtHR as the privacy floor. The CJEU decision in Kadi v.

Commission has provided ammunition for the "privacy floor" approach by
establishing that "EU concepts on fundamental rights prevail, whenever this
is necessary, over international law." 218
Nevertheless, the ECtHR has developed its jurisprudence while leaving
some room for discretion, and despite its privacy-protective orientation, many
of the ECtHR privacy decisions have recognized the need for flexibility in the
intelligence space. 219 For example, while the ECtHR has recognized "rather
strict standards" governing the interception of communication, the Court has
expressly recognized that those standards do not necessarily apply in other
intelligence gathering contexts. 22° Furthermore, the European Court has taken
the reasonable approach of recognizing the existence of tradeoffs, and has not
perpetuated the mistaken notion that surveillance constitutes a per se
violation of human rights. 221 Even Privacy International acknowledges that
intelligence activities necessarily cannot operate with complete transparency
over the scope and nature of government intelligence-sharing agreements. 222
While the ECtHR provides one possible approach, its institutional mission-

Hielke Hijmans, The European Union As Guardian of Internet Privacy: The Story of
Art 16 TFEU, 31 L. GOVERNANCE & TECH. SERIES 1, 473 (2016)
https://link.springer .com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-319-34090-6.pdf.
219 Respondent's Open Response, Privacy Int'l v. United Kingdom, Case No.
IPT/13/92/CH, (Investigatory Powers Trib. 2014) (U.K.) and Liberty v. United
Kingdom, Case No. IPT/13/77/H (Investigatory Powers Trib. 2014) (U.K.) [hereinafter
UK IPT Response], https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/sites/default/files/
The%20Intelligence%20Services%20open%20response%20to%20Liberty%E2%80%99s
%20and%20Privacy%20International%E2%80%99s%20claims%2015th%20November
%202013.pdf.
220
Id. (citing Uzun v. Germany (2011) 53 EHRR 24, at §66). See also McE v. Prison
Service of Northern Ireland [2009] 1 AC 908, per Lord Carswell at§ 85.
221
Rubinstein et al., supra note 30, at 119.
222 Human Rights Implications of Intelligence Sharing, PRIVACY INT'L 9 (2017),
https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/201712/PI%20Briefing%20to%20National%20Intelligence%200versight%20Bodies_12_Sep
t.pdf ("Privacy International specifically urges national intelligence oversight bodies,
to the extent permitted under their mandates, to: make publicly available as much
information as possible as to the nature and scope of intelligence sharing arrangements
to which their governments are party, as well as the rules governing such
arrangements[.]").
218
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orientation leads to an uncompromising approach that does not accommodate
the privacy-security balance adopted by most countries. In contrast, the
framework below secures meaningful privacy protections while still
preserving maximal respect for sovereign discretion.
i.

Principle of Legality

A basic requirement for the rule of law is that rules must be based in law, with
a degree of foreseeability and accessibility.

This principle of legality is

generally uncontroversial and considered a core principle of international
law. 223 Intelligence-sharing arrangements should have these provisions to the
extent reasonably practicable. It is true that political considerations may
weigh in favor of preventing the public disclosure of intelligence cooperation
with some countries, 224 but the principles by which governments conduct
themselves in the intelligence-sharing process would not adversely affect their
capacity to conduct their jobs. At the same time, such principles would also
provide a circulated standard against which intelligence agencies, their
counterparts, and oversight bodies could hold agency action accountable.
Both the United States and the EU agree that the ICCPR requires some
respect for privacy rights of those under a country's domestic jurisdiction.
Specifically, that states have an obligation to refrain from arbitrary or
unlawful interference" into the private lives of those under the state's
/1

domestic jurisdiction. 225 This principle of legality is expressed in the first
clause of Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights, stating

Beth Van Schaack, The Principle of Legality in International Criminal Law, 103 AM.
Soc. OF INT'L L. 101, 101 (2009) ("The principle of nullum crimen sine lege is a
fundamental principle of criminal law. It has particular resonance at the international
level given the relative lack of clarity surrounding certain international legal norms.").
224 See generally Ashley Deeks, A (Qualified) Defense of Secret Agreements, 49 Ariz. St.
L.J. 713 (2017)
http://arizonastatelawjournal.org!wp-content/uploads/2017/09 /Deeks_Pub. pdf.
225 Deeks, supra note 51, at 305 ("The United States, for example, believes that states
may engage in surveillance that is in accordance with transparent laws and that
furthers a legitimate aim. Human rights groups favor a higher standard drawn from
ECtHR case law: The interference must be necessary in the circumstances of the case
and proportional to the end sought, and the surveillance must be conducted under
specific and clearly defined laws.").
223
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that "[t]here shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as is in accordance with the law. 11226 In other words, the
exercised powers have some basis in domestic law and meet a foreseeability
requirement. 227

Accordingly, secret rules without any basis in domestic

legislation cannot be in accordance with the law for the purposes of restricting
rights. 228 This 'accordance with the law' requirement poses a low standard;
even broad delegations of power, such as those in the Chinese National
Security Law, 229 have a basis in domestic law. 230 This delegation may be
analogized to the broad "intelligible principle" requirement in American
administrative law and is unlikely to carry significant substantive impact
beyond public accessibility to the relevant law. 231
However, the law must also enable a degree of foreseeability. This has led
international privacy scholars to argue that privacy rights require that "[a]ny
limitations to the right to privacy 'must be provided for by law, and the law
must be sufficiently accessible, clear, and precise so that an individual may
look to the law and ascertain who is authorized to conduct data surveillance
and under what circumstances."' 232 As interpreted by the ECtHR, the essential
test for foreseeability asks whether the laws sufficiently indicate the scope of
discretion and the manner of exercise "to give the individual adequate
protection against arbitrary interference." 233 However, the ECtHR highlights

European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 25 (emphasis added).
Brown et al., supra note 199.
22s Id.
229
See supra notes 124, 125.
230 But see Szabo & Vissy v. Hungary, App. No. 37138/14, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment, 'II
78 (2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=OOl-160020.
231
See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 ("If Congress shall
lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body
authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a
forbidden delegation of legislative power.").
232
Lubin, supra note 51, at 542.
233
Malone v United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, (1984) 7 Eur. H.R. Rep 14, §86. See
also Weber & Saravia v. Germany, App No 54934/00, 2006-XI [2006] Eur. Ct. H.R. 1173,
Admissibility, §§ 78-79 (2006 ), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/00176586 (the laws must be sufficiently detailed to give "an adequate indication" to the
times and circumstances under which the government may engage in surveillance
activities).
226

227
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that the foreseeability requirement should not be taken to preclude effective
surveillance: "the requirement of foreseeability cannot mean that an
individual should be enabled to foresee when the authorities are likely to
intercept his communications so that he can adapt his conduct accordingly." 234
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) has echoed the
generally-accepted the legality requirement, interpreting surveillance carried
out on the basis of a law to require (a) public accessibility and (b) sufficient
precision for reasonable foreseeability of the consequences of certain
conduct. 235
In the intelligence-sharing context, applying the legality principle makes
sense. States should have laws governing intelligence sharing. The U.N.
Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights has noted
The absence of laws to regulate information-sharing agreements
between States has left the way open for intelligence agencies to
enter into classified bilateral and multilateral arrangements that are
beyond the supervision of any independent authority. Information
concerning an individual's communications may be shared with
foreign intelligence agencies without the protection of any publicly
accessible legal framework and without adequate (or any)
safeguards .... Such practices make the operation of the surveillance
regime unforeseeable for those affected by it. 236

While security concerns may weigh in favor of limiting the disclosure of
specific information sharing arrangements, laws delineating the general
circumstances and procedures under which a government engages in
intelligence sharing would allow "sufficient adequate protection against
arbitrary interference" and offset concerns of unbridled government power to
234

also

Malone v United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, (1984) 7 Eur. H.R. Rep 14, § 67. See
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION OF THE INTER-

AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE INTERNET

75 (2013) ("The State must be transparent with respect to the laws regulating
communications surveillance and the criteria used for their application. The principle
of 'maximum disclosure' is applicable to this issue.").
235
See Bignami & Resta, supra note 97. The UNHCHR elements also include (c)
provisions ensuring legitimate aims and (d) effective safeguards against abuse, but (c)
and (d) simply suggest a divergent taxonomy, as both concern safeguards against
abuse addressed below.
236 Lubin, supra note 51, at 548-49.
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exchange private information without due consideration of individual privacy
interests. Adopting public intelligence sharing standards would achieve this
goal and provide the legally grounded governance standards expected in the
international community.
Getting states to recognize the legality principle should prove relatively
uncontroversial, and states' acceptance would not likely face ideological
resistance.

The difficulty arises at the implementation stage over which

safeguards adequately ensure that the government does not engage in
arbitrary or unlawful interference. For example, the United States believes
that this limitation is satisfied as long as its surveillance is consistent with
transparent laws and furthers a legitimate aim, whereas the ECtHR adds
additional principles of necessity and proportionality. 237 The next section
seeks to untangle the morass over what should count as sufficient safeguards
against abuse.
ii.

Principle of Safeguards against Abuse

The appropriate intelligence-sharing framework should delineate procedural
requirements that safeguard against abuse. In order to fulfill the legality
principle, countries sharing information should both have publically issued
safeguarding procedures governing their intelligence practices. In Weber and
Saravia v. Germany, the ECtHR helpfully identified six procedural safeguards
to govern European communications interception:
[1] the nature of the offences which may give rise to an interception
order;
[2] a definition of the categories of people liable to have their
telephones tapped;
[3] a limit on the duration of telephone tapping;

237 Deeks, supra note 51, at 305-06 ("The United States, for example, believes that
states may engage in surveillance that is in accordance with transparent laws and that
furthers a legitimate aim. Human rights groups favor a higher standard drawn from .
. . [ECtHR] case law: The interference must be necessary in the circumstances of the
case and proportional to the end sought, and the surveillance must be conducted under
specific and clearly defined laws.").
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[4] the procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the
data obtained;
[5] the precautions to be taken when communicating the data to
other parties;
[6] and the circumstances in which recordings may or must be erased
or the tapes destroyed 238

For the purpose of intelligence sharing, Categories [1], [3], [4] and [5] are most
important.
First, states should publically disclose the nature of the offenses and
purposes that warrant intelligence sharing. Intelligence sharing should
remain limited to exchanges of intelligence information for national security
purposes and should not operate as a loophole for the transfer of other types
of information. In order for the information to be shared through intelligence
channels, the collected information should have been collected for security
purposes. For example, the United States has committed to exclusively
collecting signals intelligence for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
purposes to support national and departmental missions. 239 Intelligence
sharing agreements should provide similar commitments to exclusive
national security utilization among both the collecting and transferring
parties. This is particularly important in light of concerns that signals
intelligence may be utilized for the "purpose of suppressing or burdening
criticism or dissent, or for disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity,
race, gender, sexual orientation, or religion." 240 While states will differ on the
extent to which these protected categories may factor into national security
practices, establishing clear purposes for intelligence exchange facilitates
effective oversight and provides clear normative guidelines for the state's
intelligence apparatus. While Category [2] would help provide foreseeability
to know the specific categories of individuals liable to have their information

Lubin, supra note 51 (citing Weber & Saravia v. Germany, App No 54934/00, 2006XI [2006] Eur. Ct. H.R. 1173, Admissibility, 'II 95 (2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
webservices/content/ pdf/001-76586, ).
239 See PPD-28, supra note 96.
238

240
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shared, a definition of the purposes for which states may exchange intelligence
information provides greater utility in parsing foreseeable exchanges.
Category [3] and [6] highlight the procedures governing temporal
limitations on information sharing. While the sharing of analyzed information
does not contain a temporal aspect, joint intelligence ventures collecting raw
information could persist for an undisclosed amount of time. As a result,
intelligence-sharing laws should incorporate procedures for determining the
appropriate duration of raw intelligence sharing operations. All transferred
information could be subject to a sunset clause requiring the erasure of shared
intelligence information after six months absent explicit reauthorization. 241
Category [4] concerns important procedures related to accessing,
retaining, and storing transferred information. The procedures should
address technological procedures related to the safe storage of intelligence
information in a secure server, record keeping procedures, and logs to account
for the use or forensic inspection of the information use. Moreover, while
analyzed information should be appropriately tailored to the scope of the
request, both raw intelligence and analyzed intelligence will usually contain
personal information, and the transfer of such information should not result
in a total abdication of access controls. Therefore, states should clarify the
scope of their access controls and related procedures. For example, the
German surveillance authorization act examined in Weber provided detailed
/1

rules on storing and destroying any data obtained using these search terms,
and the authorities storing the data had to verify every six months whether
the data were still necessary to achieve the purpose for which they had been
obtained or transmitted to them." 242
Access controls are especially important given the variation in the
conceptualization of privacy harms. On the one hand, European Courts have
found that "that the storage of private information amounts to or is akin to
See, e.g., Gesetz zur Beschrankung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses
[Artikel 10-Gesetz] [G 10] [Act to Restrict the Privacy of Correspondence, Mail, and
Telecommunications] [Article 10 Act], June 26, 2001, BGBl. I at 1254, 2298, as amended,
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/gl0_2001/gesamt.pdf
(requiring
authorities storing the data had to verify every six months whether the data were still
necessary to achieve the purpose for which it had been gathered).
242 Rubinstein et al., supra note 30, at 113.
241
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Under this conception, the mere collection of

information constitutes a privacy harm. However, many states take a different
approach to data access and argue that "[u]ntil the data are accessed by
humans and used as a means of investigating or identifying particular people
... , no concrete intrusion has occurred." 244 As Deeks reports, "states seem
committed to the idea that they require access to as much data as possible to
accurately locate terrorist plots and connections among suspected terrorists,
among other threats."

245

Both offer legitimate approaches to balancing

Matthew White, Protection by Judicial Oversight, or an Oversight in Protection?, 2 J.
INFO. RTS., PoL'Y, & PRACTICE 1, 33 ("The ECtHR has previously noted that e-mail and
internet usage fall within the ambit of Article 8334 and on numerous occasions has held
that the storage of private information amounts to or is akin to secret surveillance.").
See also Lubin, supra note 51, at 515 ("As was explained by Commissioner Pillay, an
interference with the right to privacy already occurs at the point of interception.").
244 Christopher Slobogin, Policing, Databases and Surveillance: Five Regulatory
Categories, 28 (Nat'l Const. Ctr. White Paper Series, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=2551164 ("It is further assumed by the intelligence
community that the infringement of the data subjects' rights takes place only at the
point at which their data is retrieved from the "haystack on the basis of a search term,
keyword, or other selector."). Deeks points to some United States courts that have
taken this approach. Deeks, supra note 51, at 357 ("This is consistent, for instance, with
the approach some U.S. courts have taken to the Fourth Amendment; for them, a search
(and therefore an infringement on privacy) occurs when information is exposed to
possible human observation, rather than when it is copied or processed by a
computer."). But see Daskal, supra note 62, at 354 (cataloging the "rich and thick
literature" contending that simple data collection inflicts severe privacy harm); Neil M.
Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1936 (2013), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2239412 (arguing that surveillance "menaces intellectual privacy and
increases the risk of blackmail, coercion, and discrimination" and should comprise a
harm sufficient for constitutional standing).
245
Deeks, supra note 51, at 357. Such logic proceeds as follows: The retention of
information is critical because one cannot know when it will come in handy. One can
analogize to the use of Box, Dropbox or an external hard drive. You never know which
document is going to crash, so you back up all documents. Similarly, with intelligence
collection -there is a vast degree of available information, and intelligence officials
don't know what will come in handy later down the line. While one might push back
to suggest that, using the back-up example, there is no need to save every piece of
information. Instead, one prioritizes different documents to different degrees. For
example, losing a shopping list would carry far less severe consequences than the loss
of a 70-page research paper. However, such an argument misunderstands the nature
243
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privacy and security. 246 Brown et al disagree, arguing that the latter approach
"cannot be reconciled with international human rights law." 247 However,
Brown and his colleagues ground their claim of international human rights
law on European human rights law; thereby conflating the privacy-security
tradeoff for one regime with that of the entire international community. 248
Nevertheless, the differing points of restriction should encourage states to
consider access control safeguards. States that impose a higher barrier to data

of data retention. The problem with discordant pieces of information is that, prior to
an incident in question, one does not know which information will prove most
necessary. As such, the more appropriate analogy would be to ask which sources
would prove most valuable at the very onset of a research project. Without knowing
the direction of the project, it can be nearly impossible to know which information to
prioritize in advance.
246
The collection process and storage of information, in addition to the distribution
of information under the control of private companies versus government entities are
important questions beyond the scope of this discussion.
247
Brown et al., supra note 199.
248 To be sure, Brown et al. is correct as a matter of European law. The Court in Szabo
& Vissy v. Hungary, App. No. 37138/14, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment, 'II 78 (2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=OOl-160020, recognized that mass surveillance could
undermine citizen freedom if all privacy barriers were eliminated.
Indeed, it would defy the purpose of government efforts to keep terrorism at bay, if
the terrorist threat was paradoxically substituted for by a perceived threat of unfettered
executive power intruding into citizens' private spheres by virtue of uncontrolled yet
far-reaching surveillance techniques and prerogatives.
However, such a portrayal rests on the notion that there must in fact be an
intrusion -that information is actually accessed. It is also true that the Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, argued that despite "[t]he
prevention and suppression of terrorism [being] a public interest imperative of the
highest importance," bulk collection programs "pose a direct and ongoing challenge to
an established norm of international law." Ben Emmerson (Special Rapporteur on the
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while
countering terrorism), Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
while countering terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/69/397 (Sep. 23, 2014). However, United Nations
officials' pontifications on international law do not determine the state of international
law.
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collection tend to employ fewer safeguards at the data access phase. 249 In
contrast, states that do not consider privacy interests at the collection state will
likely employ measures that restrict access to more limited criteria of
conditions and circumstances. 250 Thus, access procedures for transferred data
should include measures to condition access to exchanged information, even
if state surveillance practices do not contain any access requirements. 251
Conditioning access on state-specific safeguards-further expanded in Part
0-plays a critical role in protecting the legitimate privacy interests in
disparate privacy-security regimes.
Finally, Category [5] concerns third party transfers. As such, it necessarily
incorporates all of the suggested procedures and principles outlined in this
framework for cross-border intelligence sharing. However, it also concerns
onward transfers from the receiving agency. The onward transfers may be
internal; many countries have seen a decline in the "wall" separating national
security and other law enforcement uses. 252 Intelligence transfers should be
limited to national security purposes, and measures should be undertaken to
maintain a wall over transferred information. If the recipient country would
also like to access shared intelligence for law enforcement purposes, it should
pursue that information through the appropriate channels. Intelligence
sharing should not serve as a shortcut around MLAT agreements.

For example, the United Kingdom, which imposes collection restrictions, does not
distinguish between collection and access. DAVID ANDERSON, A QUESTION OF TRUSTREPORT OF THE INVESTIGATORY POWERS REVIEW, 292-94, 2015,
https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/
06/IPR-Report-Web-Accessiblel.pdf (illustrating that the United Kingdom does not
distinguish between collection and access).
250
See Rangappa, supra note 36 (discussing the United States bulk data collection
pursuant to § 702 which contain access protections that ensure that "neither the
metadata nor the content of that communication is immediately accessible to all
agents.").
251
See Deeks supra note 51, at 305 (explaining the United States permits surveillance
as long as its surveillance is consistent with transparent laws and furthers a legitimate
aim but does not require proportionality or necessity).
252 Rubinstein et al., supra note 30, at 105 ("In many countries, this wall has been
dismantled, with the result that intelligence agencies may now, at least as a matter of
legal authority, pass information to law enforcement officials .... ").
249
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The receiving agency might also seek onward transfers of shared
information to external parties. Governments receiving information should
commit to ensuring that exchanged intelligence information is not shared with
non-governmental parties.

However, government intelligence agencies

should have the flexibility to share such information with other government
intelligence partners, in the event that the receiving party commits to the same
transfer restrictions as binding the original recipient. Of course, governments
have no obligation to share information with a third party, and political
considerations effectively restrain third-party intelligence sharing against the
originator's wishes.

Integrating data access and data sharing procedures

would help offset a major barrier to intelligence sharing: the difficulties that
countries face in verifying how a foreign government will use information sent
to it.253
In sum, safeguards against abuse should include 1) public limitations on
the purposes of government intelligence sharing; 2) public limitations on the
duration of sharing agreements and the implementation of sunset clauses; 3)
public access, retention, and storage procedures for exchanged information; 4)
and public commitment to third-party transfer procedures ensuring that
exchanged intelligence
intelligence use.
iii.

information remains

limited

to

government

Principle of Transparency and Oversight

Intelligence sharing agreements should not operate in a vacuum of
accountability. The UN General Assembly Resolution on the Right to Privacy
in the Digital Age, which calls upon all states "[t]o establish or maintain
existing independent, effective, adequately resourced and impartial judicial,
administrative and/or parliamentary domestic oversight mechanisms capable
of ensuring transparency, as appropriate, and accountability for State
surveillance of communications, their interception and the collection of
personal data . . ." 254 Furthermore, modern norms have led to a public

253 BORN ET AL., supra note 4, at 38 ("[I]ntelligence services lose full control of
information as soon as they transmit it to another body.").
254 G.A. Res 69/166, at 4 (Dec. 18, 2014). See Emmerson, supra note 248 ("One of the
core protections afforded by article 17 is that covert surveillance systems must be
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expectancy of greater transparency over intelligence activities. 255

By

establishing publically available governance measures for intelligence sharing
agreements, states will take significant steps towards transparent practices.
While the government cannot provide complete transparency to the public, it
can provide more searching internal oversight procedures.
Intelligence sharing agreements would benefit from the designation of a
specific independent official or officials responsible for overseeing intelligence
sharing exchanges and subsequent access. Many countries already have
independent oversight of surveillance and government access, with China as
a notable exception. 256 Significantly, independent oversight does not implicate
the government's chosen privacy-security tradeoff, but instead ensures that
intelligence information is handled commensurate with that government's
standards. For example, the United States has a Privacy and Civil Liberties
Official who ensures the legitimate privacy interests of data handled by the
intelligence community. 257 Such a role should operate similarly to Inspector
Generals, embedded in United States executive agencies.
In order to effectively implement intelligence transfer access controls, each
country must implement ex ante review. This oversight process already exists
through Sweden's Defense Intelligence Inspection (SIUN) body, which
monitors whether the procedural conditions have been complied with before
transferring the information in question for use by Swedish intelligence. 258
attended by adequate procedural safeguards to protect against abuse. These
safeguards may take a variety of forms, but generally include independent prior
authorization and/or subsequent independent review."). However, the Special
Rapporteur goes too far in asserting the mass collection schemes are necessarily
inconsistent with principles of individualized suspicion.
255 Deeks, supra note 63, at 618 ("Overall, the public now expects greater transparency
about intelligence activities and some governments have begun to provide it.").
256 Rubinstein et al., supra note 30, at 104.
257
PPD-28, supra note 96 (describing the principles of United States signals
intelligence collection).
258
European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Update

of the 2007 Report on the Democratic Oversight of the Security Services and Report on the
Democratic Oversight of Signals Intelligence Agencies, CDL-AD(2015)006, Study No.
719/2013, '1!'1!131-133 (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/
default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2015)006-e ("An example of a model which combines
judicial authorization with expert follow-up comes from Sweden.").
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Former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation David Anderson has
proposed a series of possible ex ante criteria that the UK could implement for
bulk data access. 259 This ex ante review requirement aligns with a CJEU
emphasis on the importance of independent authorization. 260 When assessing
government access to retained data, the CJEU has held that all access should
"be subject to a prior review carried out either by a court or by an independent
administrative body." 261 Prior review constitutes a best practice and should
be implemented across all states. Oversight independence should be
established through the criteria that 1) the overseer can only be removed for
cause; 2) the overseer is not appointed by the executive branch; and 3) the
overseer is not involved in the intelligence exchange mission.
Professor Richard Aldrich conceives the possibility of "Inspectors General
with extended authority to operate in more than one country." 262 Given that
countries will display a variety of different procedures and processes, a roving
Inspector General should not be a requirement for sharing compliance.
Nevertheless, a joint Inspector General would add particular value in joint raw
data collection enterprises. These joint enterprises, such as the compilation of
joint databases, poses greater privacy risks and would be well-served by
another layer of protection. Furthermore, this close-knit form of "far
reaching" cooperation is only likely to occur if the states maintain a close,
/1

ANDERSON, supra note 249, at 292-94 (following the British model which does not
distinguish between collection and access).
260 Ex ante authorization is not a uniquely European requirement, and the U.S. has
played a significant role in promulgating an ex ante review ethos. As Jennifer Daskal
reports, "[t]he UK government supported a new judicial review mechanism for
intercept orders in part because it knew that this would be a precondition entering into
such an agreement under US law." Jennifer Daskal, New Bill Would Moot Microsoft
Ireland
Case-And
Much
More!,
JUST
SEC.
(Feb.
6,
2018),
https ://www.justsecurity.org/51886/bill-moot-microsoft-ireland-case-more.
261 Joined Cases C-203/15 & C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post-Och telestyrelsen, 2016
EUR-Lex 62015CJ0203 (Dec. 21 2016), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62015CJ0203&from=EN ("In order to ensure, in practice, that
those conditions are fully respected, it is essential that access of the competent national
authorities to retained data should, as a general rule, except in cases of validly
established urgency, be subject to a prior review carried out either by a court or by an
independent administrative body[.])".
262
Aldrich, supra note 9, at 56.
259
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Given the muted secrecy concerns, such a

cooperative arrangement with an objective third-party Inspector General is
conceivable for a subset of states with a high commitment to public
transparency. 264

Such bodies could operate along lines similar to the

International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) in its designation and
ability to inspect treatment of prisoners of war, 265 or the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) mandate to inspect nuclear sites. Specifically, joint
intelligence operations could include an arrangement to allow an objective
party to inspect and provide reports on compliance of procedural privacy
safeguards. 266
Intelligence sharing agreements should also require states to include a
measure of ex post review to ensure that the surveillance measures undertaken
are done so according to the procedures in place. Particularly when security
exigencies require urgent government action, ex post review provides
prospective control over future behavior. As the ECtHR recognizes "a
subsequent judicial review can offer sufficient protection if a review procedure
at an earlier stage would jeopardise [sic] the purpose of an investigation or
BORN ET AL., supra note 4, at 19.
See Aldrich, supra note 9 (suggesting inspectors general with extended authority
in more than one state).
265
See, e.g., Rule 124. ICRC Access to Persons Deprived of Their Liberty, INT'L COMM.
RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/vl_rul_rule124 ("The
right of the ICRC to visit detainees in international armed conflicts is provided for in
the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions.").
266 Preexisting bilateral and multilateral exchanges between external oversight bodies
might provide a foundational framework for building international acceptance.
Examples of such bodies include "periodic meetings with national parliamentary
oversight committees organized by the European Parliament's Committee on Civil
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs; the annual Southeast European Parliamentary
Oversight Bodies' Conference; the biennial International Intelligence Review Agency
Conference (IIRAC); and the (now defunct) Conference of the Parliamentary
Committees for the Oversight of Intelligence and Security Services of the European
Union Member States." BORN ET AL., supra note 4, at 156. An institutional entity could
also provide other benefits, such as a rigorous training program that could provide best
practices for privacy protection. Such a training program could help promote
responsible handling of personal information and diminish the fears of privacy harm
stemming from intelligence practices. See Kent, supra note 186, at 12 (recommending
international standards of training for law enforcement data requests).
263

264
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surveillance." 267 Domestic audits offer one effective form of ex post review.
Such an inspection process should occur at regular intervals, with reviewable
information based on the time of access or, in exceptional circumstances, as
promptly as possible. In addition, an oversight body could scrutinize the
procedural compliance through methods such as hearings, documentary
analysis, interviews and sampling. 268 Scheduled inspections could be further
supplemented by surprise visits. In Norway, a national model is already in
place, where the Parliament's Intelligence Oversight Committee (EOS) has the
power to conduct surprise inspection visits for shared data. 269
Finally, each state should provide whistleblower protection in the event
of abuse of intelligence sharing agreements. Given the sensitivity of
intelligence operations, whistleblower protections do not need to extend to the
release of information to the public. 270 However, each state should ensure that
government employees or officials may report violations of protocols and
procedures to the relevant oversight bodies without fear of retribution.
iv.

Principle of Proportionality

States disagree about the need for a proportionality analysis in their own
surveillance operations.

The United States, for example, only requires

surveillance to meet a legitimate national security purpose, but the European
Union requires proportionality. 271 The ECtHR in Weber and Saravia established
Sommer v. Germany, App. No. 73607/13, Eur. Ct. H.R., 15 (2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=OOl-173091.
However, this model contests the
ECtHR's' subsequent proclamation that "the effectiveness of a subsequent judicial
review is inextricably linked to the question of subsequent notification about the
surveillance measures. There is, in principle, little scope for recourse to the courts by
an individual unless he or she is advised of the measures taken without his or her
knowledge and thus able to challenge the legality of such measures retrospectively."
Id.
268 BORN ET AL., supra note 4, at 147-48 (discussing some principle methods of review
for data sharing).
269
Id. at 148.
270 This more circumscribed view almost certainly departs from the whistleblower
protection envisioned by the Snowden Treaty Advocates calling for "international
protections for whistleblowers." The Snowden Treaty, supra note 195.
271 See Deeks, supra note 51 (assessing the differences between the United States' and
the ECtHR approach).
267
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a European balancing test that weighs all the circumstances of the case, such
/1

as the nature, scope and duration of the possible measures, the grounds
required for ordering them, the authorities competent to authorise, carry out
and supervise them, and the kind of remedy provided by the national law." 272
Countries will continue to differ in their decisions whether to insert
proportionality considerations in their intelligence practices. Nonetheless,
when it comes to sharing intelligence, proportionality considerations should
not be wholly absent from either the sharing or accessing of foreign
intelligence information.
First, states should condition their access of shared intelligence
information on a proportionality assessment. In order to access foreign
analyzed intelligence information, states should engage in a balancing
analysis weighing the degree of privacy intrusion, demonstrated by the nature
of the data sought and the amount of data sought, 273 against the specific
purpose for which the information is being accessed. It is important to note
that the privacy intrusion calculation should focus on the content and volume of
the information shared, and not the means by which that content was
collected. While some might prefer that all foreign intelligence include the
means by which such intelligence was collected, foreign states will not
realistically divulge such information in most circumstances. Moreover,
attempting to apply procedural collection processes across countries fails to
account for the fact that another agency could have gathered the same
information through a different process. For example, one intelligence agency
might have obtained telephone records through a targeted bulk data
collection, and another agency might have obtained the same telephone
records with a warrant-or would have been able to do so if the relevant
telephone company were located under its jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, states' domestic legislatures should retain significant
leeway in applying access controls for accessing foreign-sourced analyzed
information. These legislatures could prescribe the weight given to different
factors in a proportionality assessment. For example, the United States might
Weber & Saravia v. Germany, App No 54934/00, 2006-XI [2006] Eur. Ct. H.R. 1173,
Admissibility, 24 (2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/001-76586.
273 Slobogin, supra note 244.
272
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decide that U.S. intelligence services might only access foreign intelligence
reports that target non-U.S. citizens. Alternatively, the U.S. might require the
anonymization of U.S. citizen's personal information unless granted
permission to reinsert redacted information by the FISA court. Any such
access controls should be implemented by the receiving state. Through such a
process, domestic legislation could control the parameters and risk of
incidental use of domestically unattainable information. As explained in Part
0, this process should be further bolstered by internal oversight to ensure that
intelligence agencies do not abuse foreign intelligence sharing to circumvent
their own collection limitations. Due to widely differing privacy-security
tradeoffs, the access standards would likely exhibit wide variation. This
framework does not recommend substantive access standards beyond the
exigency exception in Part 0, but instead urges substantial flexibility in
allowing sovereign states to determine the content of its access controls.
States could create more robust access barriers that include collection
methods for the transfer of raw intelligence. Since raw intelligence has not
been altered from its initial collection form, its mode of collection is far more
easily discernable. If sharing raw intelligence, states should be willing to
either disclose the intelligence collection method or stipulate that the
collection method would not have violated the intelligence collection laws of
the partner state. Joint overseers, as suggested by Aldrich, 274 could facilitate
the more rigorous implementation of state-specific access controls.
States should also avoid transferring requested information without the
partner state sharing a purpose or justification.

Due to access control

variations in state intelligence practice, states should adopt a limited
proportionality assessment requiring legitimate justification when they
consider intelligence requests by foreign intelligence partners. Specifically,
states should confirm that their partners would use the information for a
legitimate purpose. The implementation of the proportionality requirement
might not substantively differ from the requirement to meet a national
security purpose. However, the articulation of justification and oversight
review will ensure that the shared intelligence information is only used in a

274

See Aldrich, supra note 9.
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manner consistent with that state's privacy security balance. Such analyses
should apply to requests for both metadata and "content" data. 275
Before transferring information to foreign intelligence partners,
government intelligence officials should explicitly account for privacy
interests in addition to security and political calculations. Nevertheless, the
international community would be ill-served by the adoption of a "necessity"
principle for data sharing. The UN Human Rights Experts' Brief in Kidane
provides an operational definition for necessity:
The requirement of necessity implies that restrictions must not
simply be useful, reasonable or desirable to achieve a legitimate
government objective. Instead, a State must demonstrate "in specific
and individualized fashion the precise nature of the threat" that it
seeks to address, and a "direct and immediate connection between
the expression and the threat. 276

Such a necessity requirement would force intelligence agencies to disclose
national security threats to their partners and would also require admission of
domestic vulnerabilities and weaknesses in their own national security
regimes. Additionally, states differ in their perceptions of necessity based on
potentially private information about the nature of domestic risks.
Governments would likely be unwilling to disclose such information. 277 As

275 Courts have increasingly recognized that both content data and metadata invoke
significant privacy concerns. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-203/15 & C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige
AB v. Post-Och telestyrelsen, 2016 EUR-Lex 62015CJ0203, 'II 199 (Dec. 21 2016),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62015CJ0203
&from=EN ("data [that] provides the means ... of establishing a profile of the
individuals concerned, information that is no less sensitive, having regard to the right
to privacy, than the actual content of communications."); United States v. Jones, 565
U.S. 400, 416 (2012) ("And the Government's unrestrained power to assemble data that
reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse.").
276
Brief of Amici Curiae United Nations Human Rights Experts in Support of
Plaintiff-Appellant and Reversal at 14, Doe (Kidane) v. Fed. Rep. of Eth., 851 F.3d 7
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 16-7081), 2016 WL 6476760.
277
See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 576 (2009) ("Even the probing of these
[exchanges among the ministries and agencies of foreign countries on diplomatic,
security, and intelligence issues] entails the risk that other countries will become less
willing to cooperate with the United States in sharing intelligence resources to counter
terrorism.").
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such, the state requesting the information is best situated to evaluate its need
of the information. While state with the information may refuse an
intelligence request for any number of reasons, requiring a state to conduct a
necessity test before transferring intelligence information would not serve the
public world order in facilitating critical intelligence transfers. 278
v.

Principle of Notification and Remedies

International human rights law also contains the principle of notification and
remedies. Many states do not provide notifications of data use, and remedies
vary widely across states. For intelligence sharing purposes, states should
require notification to the originator state when the recipient state
substantively accesses private information. Such provisions should also
include flexibility for the state to delay notification for a limited period of time
pursuant to ongoing operations. Mandatory state notifications would reduce
information barriers and facilitate cooperative international self-governance.
Moreover, any private right of action should be conditioned upon the
principle of sovereign consent.
Procedures for individual notification should rest on the specific state
laws, and the state should have discretion over the circumstances and timing
of notification that personal information has been accessed. The originator
state should also control the degree of disclosure, or the level of specificity of
which information was accessed or by whom. Importantly, the notification
procedures should be codified into law. This process will create political
accountability, and the scope of government notification commitments should
respond to the political process. 279
A state-based notification system places the state as a guardian ad litem,
charged with protecting the best interests of its citizens. In practice,
intelligence sharing is policed by the understanding that violations "will be
See, e.g., UK IPT Response, supra note 219, at '[208 (contending that "power to
share intelligence with a foreign intelligence agency must plainly be capable of being
'necessary"').
279 Admittedly, autocratic governments will tend to be less responsive to political
pressure. However, the process of requiring even those governments to publically
adopt a stance; even a zero-notification policy generates political pressure and
encourages accountability.
278
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sanctioned by reduction or cessation of future cooperation." 280 As such, if
intelligence officials have reason to believe their intelligence partners are
misusing shared information, they should think twice before participating in
future intelligence exchanges. While intelligence officials may have incentives
to turn a blind eye to privacy intrusive practices, the presence of independent
oversight bodies will lead to official compliance with domestic laws regarding
sharing notification procedures.
Additionally, sovereign immunity principles weigh against allowing a
private right of action absent state consent. Generally, sovereign governments
are immune from lawsuits except to the extent that a government consents to
a waiver of its immunity. 281 Sovereign immunity has also crystalized into a
principle of customary international law forbidding suits against sovereign
states in foreign jurisdictions without the states' consent. 282 Taken together,
principles of state and international respect for sovereign immunity weigh
against forcing a sovereign immunity waiver for an individual right of action.
Nevertheless, the absence of a private right of action does not mean that
individual privacy interests should remain untended. As explained above, the
state has a responsibility to protect the privacy interests of its citizens. Against
this backdrop, the cooperative nature of intelligence sharing leaves room for
pressure and leverage through informal processes to deter future privacy
violations.

Finally, state oversight bodies have jurisdiction over privacy

violations, and depending on the individual notification procedures, states
can establish processes by which individuals or state representatives may
bring claims against the government for procedural or substantive harms
incurred as a result of an intelligence-sharing agreement. 283

BORN ET AL., supra note 4, at 38.
See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) ("The United States,
as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued.").
282 Xiaodong Yang, Sovereign Immunity, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES, (May 25, 2016),
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo9780199796953-0018 .xml.
283
Ian Brown has gone so far as to suggest that "illegal surveillance should be
criminalized." Brown, supra note 154, at 31. While states have the flexibility to
criminalize surveillance activities, considerations underlying the United States'
discretionary function exemption of official immunity likely applies here-namely, in
280
281
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Principle of Complementarity

Another important international law principle relevant for intelligence
sharing concerns complementarity. The principle of complementarity
11

counsels deference based on both the imperatives of sovereignty and other

provisions of international law, including the law of armed conflict and U.N.
Security Council resolutions that require global cooperation to combat
terrorism." 284 In the realm of privacy rights, complementarity encourages
allowing a margin of flexibility for how states apply those rights in practice
vis-a-vis security interests. The European Court of Human Rights recognized
such a complementarity principle in Leander v. Sweden, holding that Sweden
had a wide "margin of appreciation" when choosing the means for achieving
the legitimate aim of protecting national security.28s
When applied to intelligence sharing, the traditional complementarity
principle receives reinforcement by the notion of international comity, or the
idea that states should adjudicate their laws in a way that "respect[ s] the
sovereign rights of other nations by limiting the reach of its own laws and their
enforcement." 286 Concerns of comity should provide states with special
flexibility in arranging intelligence sharing agreements.

Specifically, this

principle encourages states to grant greater deference to state national security
practices than they might otherwise exercise in other contexts. The principle
of complementarity provides the flexibility necessary to facilitate intelligence
sharing in a world of differing privacy-security tradeoffs.
vii. Principle of Good Faith

The principle of good faith must govern intelligence sharing arrangements.
Namely, all information requests and request fulfillments should be carried
out in good faith. Such an obligation mimics the good-faith exception to the

protecting the officials from "liability that would seriously handicap efficient
government operations." United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984).
284 Margulies, supra note 173, at 2139.
285
Leander v. Sweden, App No 9248/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433 at '[59 (1987).
286 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 128 (2013). See generally Jesner
v. Arab Bank, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018) (tackling questions of international comity).
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United States' Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. United States courts
generally do not permit the use of evidence collected in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 287 However, this exclusionary rule does not apply when an
official conducts a search or seizure with a reasonable good faith belief that
the search was consistent with the rule of law. 288 Similarly, national
intelligence agencies should be able to share and utilize shared information as
long as they have a reasonable good faith belief that both they and their
intelligence partners have complied with the agreed-upon legal procedures. 289
This good faith principle plays a critical role in respecting the obligation
that states do not use intelligence-sharing practices to circumvent domestic
safeguards through revolving door tactics. United States Executive Order
12333 establishes such a principle for U.S. conduct, and forbids members of
the United States intelligence community from participating in or requesting
any activities that they could not lawfully carry out themselves-including
intelligence collection. 290 Similarly, good faith privacy protection motivates
the tailoring of information delivered in the course of surveillance requests.
To the extent that domestic regimes of a receiving state provide higher
standards of protection on a given issue, such as limitations on the use of
national' s information, the presence of an independent oversight apparatus
can also facilitate good-faith compliance.
Just as states should not request foreign intelligence agencies to engage in
unlawful practices, states should also not share data that they know the
partner states could not collect. Instead, foreign states should undertake a
good-faith effort to avoid sharing information that, to a non-trivial degree,
relies on information that their intelligence partner could not have lawfully
collected. This should not impose an obligation on states to comb their

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984) ("[T]he exclusionary rule be more
generally modified to permit the introduction of evidence obtained in the reasonable
good-faith belief that a search or seizure was in accord with the Fourth Amendment.").
289
Of course, the good faith "use" of information here differs from the exclusionary
rule context; while the exclusionary rule is concerned with evidentiary inclusion,
intelligence sharing involves utilization by information by other intelligence
operatives.
290 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, § 2.12 (1982).
287
288
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analyzed intelligence reports to prevent any incidental disclosure of private
information. Rather, the sharing states should make a good-faith effort to
provide the information that the receiving state needs for implementing its
access controls.

For example, the United States might request a threat

assessment of a particular organization from Great Britain, and that report
might contain some information through a method that the receiving state
could not have undertaken. The United States might not allow for foreign
intelligence containing personal information on U.S. nationals in the absence
of a warrant. In order for U.S. intelligence agencies to access the report, they
might need to meet legislated access controls that require an independent
authorizer to attest that the report does not contain information about U.S.
citizens. If so, then the U.S. intelligence sharing request could request that the
U.K. specify whether the report contains information about U.S. citizens so
that the U.S. agency can undertake the necessary steps for authorized access.
The UK should make a good faith effort to comply with such a request. If
states adopt limitations that are too exacting, these exclusions could impose
significant costs on each party. Including stakeholders from the intelligence
agencies when designing access controls will go a long way towards
minimizing the costs of such information requests.
Without good faith, state intelligence sharing cannot operate out of the
public eye. The intelligence sharing system must therefore be established in a
fashion that breeds public trust in the processes and procedures undergirding
these covert operations shrouded in secrecy. 291 As former U.S. President
Obama commented in light of United States anti-terrorism tactics, "If people
can't trust not only the executive branch but also don't trust Congress and
don't trust federal judges to make sure that we're abiding by the Constitution,
due process and rule of law, then we're going to have some problems here." 292
Public faith in the good will of the intelligence community is foundational to
a robust security establishment. However, state security interests do not
require blind faith. Good faith principles combined with publically available
procedural safeguards can help shore up popular legitimacy. Taken together,
291 For a list of benefits that arise from maintaining the secrecy of intelligence
cooperation, see Deeks, supra note 224.
292 See Nicholas & Gorman, supra note 34.
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these seven principles allow for public disclosure and facilitate accountability
without undermining the privacy-security tradeoff.
viii. Exigency Exception for Non-Compliant States

This framework should also anticipate that not every state would immediately
adopt these principles. For the reasons outlined above, an effort to completely
block intelligence sharing with non-compliant states would be both
impractical and highly dangerous for all states involved. So how should states
approach states who lack the important safeguards outlined in this
framework? First, it is clear that intelligence agencies should be limited in
their ability to share information with countries that do not adopt the policies
consistent with the principles above. Nonetheless, not all intelligence sharing
directly implicates individual privacy rights. As such, states can still share
and receive strategic and operational information with non-compliant
intelligence partners as long as the information does not contain personally
identifiable information. For example, important policy analyses related to
foreign policy developments or general threat assessments of a particular
group will not necessarily disclose personal information.293
One might imagine a situation in which an intelligence agency discovers
information necessary to prevent a serious threat to the welfare of another
state. In such circumstances, an exigency exception should prove appropriate.
Specifically, this exigency exception should allow agencies to provide or
receive necessary information, even if it includes personal information, in the
limited scenario of a high-probability event that reasonably threatens the loss
of life or substantial disruption to core operational services. Furthermore, the
state must reasonably believe that the additional information presents
"material" information germane to the reduction of the threat. Under these
limited circumstances, non-compliant foreign partners may share intelligence
information under the exigency exception. However, due to information
asymmetries, the receiving state may realize that the shared information does
not actually meet the exacting exigency standards. In these situations, the
While one can make the case for a public figure exception whereby public figures
enjoy diminished privacy protections, such an exploration lies beyond the scope of this
Article.
293
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receiving state should still be able to utilize the information as long as it
determines that the information was shared in good faith.
The presence of exigent circumstances does not relieve a state of its
responsibility to protect individual privacy. When states share information
under such circumstances, they should seek to tailor the information granted
to the specific request. When transferring information, states should limit
sharing personally identifiable information to the extent reasonable. As part
of this effort, states should avoid sharing raw intelligence data whenever
feasible, and should instead convey the necessary information through
analyzed "end product" intelligence. Additionally, compliant states should
request that states receiving such intelligence only use this information for its
intended purpose, although such an endeavor is unlikely to have any practical
impact.
While this framework sets the expected standards to govern state transfers
of intelligence information to non-compliant states, states may carve out
additional exceptions. While recipient states would not have the ability to
share intelligence information received from framework-compliant states, all
states would still retain the sovereign discretion to engage in additional
sharing agreements with other states. However, any information received
from non-compliant states would still be subject to the procedural
requirements detailed above. While deviations from this framework would
likely be domestically unpopular, one could imagine popular limited
exceptions, such as one that allows countries to share information related to
border migration, regardless of internal governance standards.
This exigency exception should also apply to intelligence sharing among
framework-compliant states. Specifically, the framework should allow the
transfer of "exigent" information that would otherwise be barred due to
revolving door concerns. Finally, in accordance with the principle of legality,
states should undertake to codify the parameters of this exigency exception
into domestic law.

D. Application
This Section seeks to concretize the above framework by testing the suggested
framework against plausible scenarios.

The scenarios focus on bilateral
77
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intelligence sharing. Each of the below scenarios explore the actions that State
A must take to comply with the proposed intelligence-sharing framework.
i.

Scenario One: Sharing Intelligence

Suppose that State A's intelligence agency, while conducting surveillance in
accordance with its domestic laws, intercepts six text message
communications between two foreign nationals. The intercepted messages
displays sympathies with a designated terrorist group's political goals, and
mentions a willingness to further the group's cause in their home countries,
States B and C. State A's intelligence agency would like to share this
information with States B and C.

However, State A has adopted laws

implementing the proposed framework through public statutes, as required
by the legality principle. How does State A proceed?
State A must initially assess whether it can share the gathered information
with States B and C. This assessment raises two questions. First, States A's
intelligence community will need to look to the procedural requirements that
State A has legislated into domestic law to determine whether sharing this
information serves a legitimate purpose. State A will have legislated public
limitations on the purposes of government intelligence sharing in according
with the Principle of Safeguards Against Abuse. Let us assume that the
legitimate purposes include the sharing of information to prevent threats to
terrorism and national security, serious crimes, and threats to public safety.
As such, the proposed information sharing would meet legitimate goals under
the statute.
Next, State A must assess whether States B and C have adopted this
intelligence-sharing framework. Let us assume that State B has adopted the
framework, but State Chas not. This difference leads the analysis to diverge
for the subsequent steps of the intelligence sharing process. Let us first focus
on State B.
Because State B has adopted procedures consistent with the intelligence
sharing framework, State A can easily assess State B's public laws to confirm
that its intelligence sharing procedures provide the necessary procedural
protections. Specifically, State A can confirm that State B has safe information
storage procedures, has temporal limitations on the retention of shared
78
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information, and will not engage in third- party transfers, except with
intelligence agencies who have adopted this same framework.
Under the sharing framework, State B will also need to conduct a
proportionality test before accessing such information, balancing the nature of
the data sought and the amount of data sought against the specific purpose
for which the information is being accessed. Due to the fact that State B did
not request the information (and therefore does not know enough to conduct
the analysis), State A will need to explain the general nature of the intelligence.
In this case, State A's explanation would detail the fact that State A identified
text messages suggestive of a high-risk individual interested in aiding the
terrorist's goals. State A would then deliver those six messages. An
independent oversight officer in State B would then need to conduct a
proportionality test before accessing that information.

In this case, the

government purpose would be to identify high-risk individuals for national
security and the privacy intrusion would comprise the six messages, as well
as the cell phone numbers of the communicators. Oversight officers in State B
would liaise with officers in State A to ensure that State B has enough
information to apply its domestic access controls.
State B, after having accessed this information and finding cause for
serious concern, might believe that more of the text messages contain
important information.

State B might request State A to transfer all

intercepted text messages by one of the communicators for a three-month time
frame. However, State B can only request such information if State B believes
in good faith that State B's domestic law would allow the intelligence agency
to lawfully intercept these messages. Even if State B would be legally
permitted to obtain such information, the Principle of Safeguards Against
Abuse requires State B to condition any access to the transferred text messages
in line with all legislated access controls.
The intelligence agencies in State A and State B would have the advice and
counsel of their respective oversight officers as they transferred, processed,
and accessed the shared information. Moreover, each agency would be subject
to governmental audits to facilitate an ex post review. Once State B accesses
the transferred intelligence data, State B must inform State A. State A will then
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follow its domestic laws governing the relevant notification procedures to the
parties in question.
State A must take a different approach with State C. State C has not
adopted the intelligence-sharing framework. As such, State A faces more
limited options. State A can only share information if it falls into the exigency
exception-namely, a high-probability event that reasonably threatens the
loss of life or substantial disruption to core operational services.

The

identification of potentially dangerous terrorist sympathizers would not meet
this high standard. Therefore, State A would not be able to share this
intelligence information with State C (unless States A and C have negotiated
a separate bilateral agreement). However, State A's inability to share the text
messages does not mean that State A is completely hamstrung. State A can
still warn State C without divulging any personal information. For example,
State A might inform State C that they have reason to believe that State C has
terrorist sympathizers in their country, and State C should exercise vigilance.
In the event that State A later learned that one of the identified sympathizers
has purchased explosives in preparation for a terrorist plot, State A would be
able to share information with State C under the exigency exception.
However, State A should avoid sharing raw intelligence information, and
instead provide a report to State C identifying the suspect and the nature of
the threat.
ii.

Scenario Two:

Receiving Intelligence

Imagine that through the course of its lawful intelligence practice, State A's
intelligence services discover that two foreign individuals, residing in State B
and citizens in State C, are likely involved in a plot against State A. State A
only has limited intelligence on these individuals. As such, State A contacts
its intelligence partners in State B and C to learn if they can provide
information related to these two individuals and assist in their threat
assessment.
State B has adopted the proposed intelligence-sharing
framework; State C has not.
State B has also observed these two State C nationals with concern, and
through an extensive bulk collection program, has pulled the raw
communications data for these two suspected individuals for the last three
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months, and has compiled analyzed reports. State B finds that State A's
request meets a permissible purpose and has established procedures in
accordance with the intelligence-sharing framework. After ensuring that the
shared information is reasonably tailored to State A's request, State B shares
its analyzed reports and communications interceptions with State A.
State A cannot access the communications information without applying
its own access controls. Imagine that State A's legislature has enacted rules
that forbid its intelligence community to use bulk interception practices to
gather information on any person and does not allow the access of foreign
intelligence concerning any State A nationals without a judicial warrant.
Before accessing the transferred information, an independent authorizer in
State A would need to conduct an ex ante review to confirm that the transferred
intelligence would not violate State A's access requirements.

State A's

authorizer reviews the transferred information and notices a reference to a
State A national. The authorizer must then redact the information revealing
personal information about the State A national. State A might ask whether
the raw intelligence information was collected through bulk surveillance.
State B would either have to answer State A's question or not share the bulk
data. Assuming that State B explained that the information had been gathered
through bulk interception, State A would then need to determine if there were
a way by which State A could access the information. While State A might
have an absolute rule allowing for no exceptions for bulk interceptions, it also
might have a rule that permits access to a targeted subset of the bulk dataset
with independent judicial authorization. Thus, State A's domestic legislation
would determine State A's ability to access such information. If State A
accesses personal information from State B's report, State A must notify State
B. State B would then carry out notifications in line with the notification

requirements outlined in its domestic legislation. State A would also need to
erase the transferred data in accordance to agreed-upon retention limitations.
Unless State A has a separate intelligence sharing agreement with State C,
State A would probably not be able to receive information from State C.
However, if State A's preexisting intelligence leads them to reasonably believe
that a) the plot against State A poses a "high-probability event that reasonably
threatens the loss of life or substantial disruption to core operational services,"
81
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and b) State C's intelligence could offer "material information germane to the
reduction of the threat;" then State A could request such information from
State C. However, any information received by State C under the exigency
exception could only be used for the specific threat for which the information
was requested.

VI.

DEFENSE AGAINST
COMMON CRITIQUES

A. Insufficient Privacy Protection
The framework above will likely raise some critiques. Most predictable is the
critique from the European privacy rights camp, arguing that the proposed
framework will allow intelligence sharing of information with lesser privacy
protections than are mandated by the European Court of Human Rights.
Substantively, this criticism is correct. If one adopts a singular approach
where privacy concerns operate as the only valid interest at play, then the
above framework would inexcusably disregard fundamental rights.
However, such an argument stumbles once one reintroduces a critically absent
component:

the context.

As this Article demonstrates, privacy interests

operate in tension with another fundamental right. While privacy activists will
nominally recognize that their "fundamental" privacy right is not in fact
absolute, such recognition is usually just that-nominal. Take for example
Hielke Hijmans' s The European Union as Guardian of Internet Privacy. In one
line during his six-hundred page tome, Hijman recognizes that "[t]hreats to
security may require restrictions to the exercise of fundamental rights." 294
Even Hijmans's language is striking-"fundamental" rights connote absolute
and inalienable qualities. Given the legitimate restriction of these rights, they
clearly do not carry an absolute quality. If threats to security warrant the
restriction of fundamental rights, then it serves to reason that threats to
security also implicate fundamental rights. In short, there is a tradeoff here.
Given the presence of a tradeoff between fundamental rights, privacy
advocates'
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inappropriately misconstrues the moral considerations. By downplaying the
human rights interests in adequate security, privacy advocates paint their
advocacy for greater privacy protections as a unilateral quest for maximizing
human rights. For example, claims proliferate founded upon the assumption
that strengthening privacy at the expense of security will lead to "the
establishment of a high ceiling rather than a low floor for human rights
protection and accountability." 295 Similarly, this blinkered viewpoint leads to
characterizations of counterterrorism practices leading to privacy limitations
as "[a] race to the bottom concerning the right to privacy." 296 Such pejorative
language disparages legitimate security behavior protecting fundamental
rights.
The European Union, with support from privacy activists around the
world, has staked out the moral high ground, declaring that their desired
balance-and none others-deserve consideration or deference. As Maria
Tzanou observes, "the EU has successfully constructed the image of itself as a
'moral leader of good in the fight against terrorism due to its alleged higher
respect to human rights standards compared to the US." 297 Hijman reports
that European Council intentionally sought to set globalization within a
/1

moral framework." 298 Once the privacy-security balance has been 'moralized,'
the heart of the question becomes whether states can legitimately strike
different balances along this spectrum.
According to the European Union and privacy activists, that answer is no.
The European Union has adopted its role on the basis that its values are
"normatively desirable and universally applicable." 299 Hijmans provides a
helpful descriptor for this practice: "regulatory imperialism." 300 The CJEU has
encouraged this path towards European exceptionalism with its decision in
Kadi: "EU concepts on fundamental rights prevail, whenever this is necessary,

over international law. EU law contains principles that must be respected in
Brown et al, supra note 199.
Tzanou, supra note 144, at 101.
297 Id. at 100.
298 Hijmans, supra note 218,
at 482-83. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/
10.1007/978-3-319-34090-6.pdf.
299 Id; see also Bignami & Resta, supra note 97, at 16.
300
Hijmans, supra note 218, at 488.
295
296
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the international domain, are not negotiable and subject to full review of the
EU Courts." 301
If one believes the European standard offers immutable expressions of
absolute morality, then my framework will be troubling. Stephen Schulhofer
has explicitly embraced this approach, and strenuously opposes the effort "to
find international common ground" because multilateral negotiation would
create a more permissive sharing regime that would create, in his morallyinfused words, "a race to the regulatory bottom." 302 Of course, for many, a
major thrust of this intelligence sharing critique is that currently no country
provides adequate privacy protections over intelligence transfers - European
human rights law just provides the most promising path forward.
The proposed framework compromises on privacy absolutist ideals in a
number of ways. First, the framework argues that data access controls as
opposed to data collection controls should not prohibit intelligence sharing
agreements. The framework also largely defers the content of such access
controls to the domestic state. Second, the framework applies a watered-down
proportionality test, and does not call for an independent necessity test.
Instead, it would allow legitimate government intelligence requests without
an inquiry or adjudication into alternative pathways for acquiring such
information.
Third, it does not require governments to authorize
whistleblowing to the general public. Fourth, it provides for state-notification
and does not mandate individual notification. Fifth, it does not demand an
individual right of action. Nevertheless, the adoption of such a framework
would pose a major step forward for privacy rights by legislating overdue
transparency and oversight in a field long obscured by a foggy ether. 303
Privacy concerns animated by domestic surveillance practices are also
mitigated in intelligence sharing. As Schulhofer notes, "US data-collection
programs pose a far greater risk of chilling political dissent within the US than
of chilling political activity by Germans or Canadians critical of their own

Id. at 473.
Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 240.
303 This framework also does not discuss control of voluntary disclosures by Internet
Service Providers, an area that warrants further analysis in the future.
301

302
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governments." 304 While foreign governments are less likely to respect an
individual's privacy interests, they also have limited means to suppress rights
abroad. Thus, to the extent that intelligence sharing serves to provide data on
foreigners, some privacy concerns are diminished.3os
Additionally, the flexibilities of this approach make this framework
practicable. The framework governs intelligence sharing practices yet places
a light touch on the surveillance methods employed in each country. Privacy
idealists too often ignore that a failure to grant intelligence operations special
treatment will result in widespread noncompliance. 306 After all, law as
practiced within the "real world" context- operating under an operational
code-are viewed as lawful by those operators. 307 This remains true even
when those operational laws deviate from the established myth system. 308
Following Asaf Lubin' s lead, this Article urges a practical orientation that
would shatter the "Geneva echo chamber" and reintroduce government
stakeholders into the discussion. 309 Furthermore, while some might find
attractive the notion of disregarding foreign balances, the reality is that
"countries with different values, ... for instance, the BRICS countries 310 are
gaining more economic power." 311 The BRIC countries are not only growing
in economic power, but many also have extensive intelligence apparatuses.

Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 260.
This is not to say that information sharing does not cause any privacy harm. Many
of the privacy concerns outlined in Part 0 still apply.
306 See Deeks, supra note 63, at 602 ("The formalists ignore that there is something
unique about intelligence activity, and that requiring intelligence services to play by
precisely the same rules as law enforcement, diplomatic, and military actors is doomed
to produce state noncompliance.").
307
Lubin, supra note 51, at 511 (citing W. Michael Reisman, Myth System and
Operational Code, 3 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 229, 230 (1977)).
3os Id.
309 Id. at 551-52 ("This piece proposes recognizing the legitimacy behind certain
limited legal differentiations in treatment for domestic and foreign surveillance. Such
recognition, quite a concession on the part of the 'Geneva echo chamber,' would bring
government agencies back to the table.").
310
See BRIC, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/
dictionary/english/bric (last visited Mar. 13, 2019) (referring to the economic pact
comprised of Brazil, Russia, India and China).
311 Hijmans, supra note 218, at 459.
304
305
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These countries are developing the economic strength to withstand regulatory
imperialism, and the need for information sharing means that their interests
cannot simply be ignored. In short, this paper incorporates flexibilities, and
by doing so, promulgates standards that could actually work.

B. Undermines Democratic Accountability
A similar critique suggests that an international framework undermines
democratic accountability. Contrary to these complaints, this international
framework will strengthen the role of civil society in holding governments
accountable. Some activists have suggested that any international privacy
sharing agreement would "sideline the courts, disempower legislative bodies
and privacy advocates, defuse commercial pressure for strong privacy
safeguards, and create a dynamic controlled almost exclusively by the
executive and its national security establishment." 312 However, this fear
ignores the limited control that civil society currently exerts - intelligence
sharing remains a black box. By bringing (more) sunshine to the shadows of
intelligence cooperation, privacy activists will receive the benefit of pushing
standards and accountability into these practice areas.

Even more

importantly, the intelligence-sharing framework furthers transparency in far
less privacy-sympathetic regimes, thereby providing an avenue for civil
society to make further inroads on government accountability.

C. International Agreements Are Unrealistic
Many scholars view the notion of any international information-sharing
regime as a fanciful one. While proposing international agreements might be
an attractive theoretical exercise, many question the practical utility of
pushing for "an international treaty forged out of pixie dust." 313 In other
words, even if one accepts the principles outlined under the proposed
framework, states would never agree to an international treaty. Academics
provide many reasons for their skepticism: varying privacy commitments,
foreign mistrust, and state sovereignty concerns.

312
313

86

Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 240.
Woods, supra note 59, at 781.

2019]

i.

LEGALIZING INTELLIGENCE SHARING

Irreconcilable Ideological Differences

Doubters suggest that states' different privacy-security balances pose an
insuperable barrier to intelligence sharing. This perspective posits a
"probably unbridgeable-gulf" between different states' commitment to
privacy protection. 314 As one skeptic reports, "There is absence of global
consensus at an aspirational level, in particular, where this approach implies
agreement with countries that do not share basic democratic values." 315
Another suggests that an international agreement "will necessarily be
based on a lowest common denominator." 316 These realists are correct to
recognize the different surveillance standards across countries, and an attempt
to coerce all states to a uniform practices would not succeed. The proposed
framework recognizes this ideological reality, and grants states significant
discretion in the ways that they carry out intelligence work.

Instead of

prescribing an ideological viewpoint, the framework sidesteps these
unyielding ideological positions by requiring unobjectionable procedural
processes that facilitate the unifying interest in accessing critical intelligence.
ii.

Too Much Foreign Mistrust

Another critique dismisses an intelligence-sharing agreement as unattainable
due to an insufficient level of popular trust. While citizens might submit to
some degree of surveillance by their own government, they would not
necessarily agree to similar oversight by foreign entities. As one observer put
it, "Brits may have become used to the CCTV cameras and Automatic Number
Plate Recognition technology that allows their own government to monitor
their travel - but they would be considerably more dubious about letting the
Germans and the French do the same." 317

While some citizens will

See Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 254 (asserting that, notwithstanding existing
frameworks between the United States and other Western states, "the complexity of
the issues and the diametric opposition" ensure that progress "will be arduous and
slow").
31s Hijmans, supra note 218, at 491.
316 See Woods, supra note 59, at 788.
317 Robin Simcox, Europe, Stop Trying To Make 'Intelligence Sharing' Happen, FOREIGN
PoL'Y (Apr. 14, 2016, 3:19PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/14/europe-stop-tryingto-mak-brussels-paris-bombings.
314
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undoubtedly find this scope unsettling, this discomfort would not likely pose
a practical barrier. This is the case for several reasons. First, the procedural
safeguards significantly reduce the degree of the privacy harm. States can
only share information under heavily prescribed circumstances. The fact that
only foreign intelligence officials can access the information would also
significantly diminish citizen reticence. The average citizen is unlikely to fear
that he or she will be a subject of a foreign national security investigation. As
a result, most citizens will not see this law as impacting their lives. Moreover,
the notification regime requiring home states to notify individuals whenever
foreign intelligence agencies access their private information will further
mollify citizen concerns. In short, the intelligence-sharing framework
sufficiently curtails citizens' privacy risks to avoid popular resistance.
iii.

Compromises State Sovereignty

Another critique questions this framework as hobbling state sovereignty.
According to this argument, national governments will not submit to an
agreement that limits their ownership over their privacy-security balance.
Instead of the domestic national legislature determining the appropriate level
of privacy intrusion, foreign states violate that national compact through
sharing intelligence collected through different standards. This would be a
legitimate concern, were it not for the presence of access controls. Through
the exercise of access controls, states maintain control over their intelligence
agencies' acceptable practices. Relatedly, it true that this framework facilitates
intelligence sharing with foreign states that do not necessarily subscribe to the
same privacy standards.

However, it would be a mistake to consider

intelligence sharing as diminishing state sovereign control. As Jennifer Daskal
points out, "[T]his critique assumes a world that does not exist. It assumes
that foreign governments will comply with the existing diplomatic procedures
for accessing sought-after data rather than seeking out means of accessing the
data unilaterally." 318 In the absence of intelligence agreements, foreign
intelligence agencies would attempt to gather the same intelligence
information by sweeping and privacy-invasive collection of raw data. By
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developing procedural limitations for the use of shared intelligence that
render such invasive tactics less necessary, states reduce the incentive for
costly foreign surveillance efforts. Therefore, the intelligence framework
would likely allow states to exercise far greater sovereign control over the
shared information.
Others argue that state national security branches have little interest in
allowing any further limitations on their near-absolute discretion over
intelligence practices. In other words, government officials have a strong
interest in maintaining the status quo. However, this approach overlooks the
changing norms leading to a public expectancy of greater transparency over
intelligence activities. 319 Even those countries that do not face public pressure
are indirectly impacted by this normative trend. The push for government
accountability has jeopardized the ability for other states to receive foreign
intelligence. Given the collective interest-and need-for intelligence sharing,
governments have an interest in adopting procedural practices that will allow
for intelligence sharing without compromising their national intelligence
practices. Sovereign states enter international agreements that they view in
their national interest, and adopting this framework promotes vital security
interests.

VII.

PATHWAYS TO
IMPLEMENTATION

The proposed framework benefits from multiple avenues towards
implementation. The first option is through unilateral, domestic legislation.
Unlike many areas of the anarchic international arena, no collective action
problem prevents unilateral adoption by individual states. As the public eye
increasingly scrutinizes intelligence practices and calls for intelligence reform,
states will also experience unprecedented constraints on intelligence sharing
at a time when such sharing has never been more vital. The CJEU decisions
in Schrems and Canada PNR320 are only the tip of the iceberg. As states fill out
their surveillance jurisprudence, they will continue to proliferate incompatible
319
Deeks, supra note 63, at 618 ("Overall, the public now expects greater transparency
about intelligence activities and some governments have begun to provide it.")
320
See Opinion 1/15, 'II 1, ECLI:EU:C:2017:592.
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sharing regimes.

Rather than continue their collision course with other

privacy regimes, states can adopt these proposed procedures. As detailed
above, states can adopt these procedures with minimal cost to their preferred
privacy-security balance.
In order to be maximally effective, states would want to adopt these
regulations with their closest intelligence allies. Fortunately, preexisting
cooperation abounds.

As Orin Kerr reports,

/1

A complex web of global,

regional, and bilateral treaties now exists addressing a wide range of crimes,
such as cybercrime, corruption, transnational organized crime, narcotics, and
terrorism." 321 Nations have already adopted information-sharing agreements
through MLATs 322 and through financial intelligence cooperation. 323
Bilateral agreements also provide a promising approach. A small core of
states pushing this framework through bilateral agreements could quickly
lead to sustained momentum. The Group of Eight (GS) countries-made up
of France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Japan, the United States,
Canada, and Russia might be one place to start. The GS already has a history
of coordinating regulatory efforts of a series of internet-related crimes,
including industrial and state espionage. 324 The GS states' extensive
intelligence capabilities grant this group exceptional influence over promoting

Orin S. Kerr & Sean D. Murphy, Government Hacking to Light the Dark Web: What
Risks to International Relations and International Law?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 58, 61 (2017).
322 See primer discussion on the United States' use of MLAT agreements, supra note
321

13.
Mara Lemos Stein, The Morning Risk Report: Financial-Intel-Sharing Groups Need
RISK & COMPLIANCE J.
(Jan. 10, 2018, 7:32 AM),
https://blogs. wsj. com/riskandcompliance/2018/01/10/the-morning-risk-reportfinancial-intel-sharing-groups-need-di versi ty; see also International Programs, U.S.
DEP'T
TREASURY:
FINANCIAL
CRIMES
ENFORCEMENT
NETWORK,
https://www.fincen.gov/resources/international-programs (last visited Oct. 11, 2018)
("FinCEN is one of the most active FIUs in the world in terms of exchanging
information with counterpart FIUs. The demand for FinCEN's services from foreign
FIUs has expanded dramatically over the past decade.").
324 Ghappour, supra note 159, at 1131 (citing Jack Goldsmith, Unilateral Regulation of
the Internet: A Modest Defence, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 135, 147 (2000)).
323

Diversity, WALL ST. J.:
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such a framework. 325 This could arise through an informal agreement, or even
the development of a multinational institution.
Financial intelligence cooperation shows the promise of such an approach.
The effort to promote financial intelligence exchange has led to the
development of a distinct international institution, the Egmont Group,
comprised of 155 Financial Intelligence Units. 326 Egmont has played a role in
responding to terrorist financing and provided a secure technological
platform for financial intelligence exchange. 327 The long-term establishment
of such an organization could help reduce information costs of monitoring
intelligence-sharing which states have legislated sufficient procedural
safeguards.
Formal international treaties offer another way forward.

These

agreements can move through the United Nations, which some have argued
presents "the legitimate forum for the negotiation of a global legal
framework." 328 However, others have argued that adopting an international
agreement would trade efficiency for a cumbersome process that could
prolong and delay adoption of new domestic legislation. 329 Nevertheless,
formal international agreements could clarify the specific elements of the
framework and ensure that all states are applying the same framework. As
intelligence sharing becomes a more regulated practice, a treaty might help
codify a widespread state practice. At this time, such an approach would
likely be premature.

American data providers' dominance over the global market gives the United
States in particular tremendous leverage in facilitating an intelligence-sharing regime.
See Daskal, supra note 51, at 474.
326
About, EGMONT GROUP, https://egmontgroup.org/en/content/about (last visited
Oct. 11, 2018).
327
Egmont Group, Group of Financial Intelligence Units, Annual Report 2015-2016
11 (2017), https://egmontgroup.org/en/filedepot_download/1660/45.
328 Report on the meeting of the Expert Group to Conduct a Comprehensive Study
on Cybercrime, UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.4/2017/4, '[43 (Apr. 24, 2017),
http://www.unodc.org/ documents/organized-crime/cybercrime/Cybercrime-April2017/Cybercrime_report_2017/Report_Cyber_E.pdf.
329
Koops & Goodwin, supra note 32, at 83 ..
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VIII.

CONCLUSION

In the early 21st century, the international community remains comprised of
independent, sovereign nation states. These sovereign states will choose
different privacy security tradeoffs. Governments will need to navigate a way
to maintain intelligence sharing in an age when government surveillance
receives increasing scrutiny. As one British parliamentarian aptly articulated,
"We need to face up to the challenge -not duck, ignore, or pretend it is not
there-[t]o preserve the legal safeguards that ensure that our intelligence
services can do their job."330
The proposed intelligence framework offers a road forward; one that
respects sovereign choices and also comports with international law. The
proposed intelligence framework is practicable and promises unprecedented
transparency in an area long devoid of legal governance.

Countries

implementing this framework would create unparalleled democratic
accountability, without undermining intelligence officials' ability to do their
jobs.

Governments will be able to keep people safe and also provide

meaningful privacy protection.
As privacy activists demand greater
transparency on intelligence sharing, both governments and privacy
advocates should consider this framework as a compromise path forward. In
short, this framework empowers countries to transform the impending clash
of privacy-security regimes into an opportunity for a new era of global
cooperation and transparency.

15 Mar. 2018, Parl. Deb HC (2018) col. 158, https://hansard.parliament.uk/
commons/2018-03-15/debates/831521d4-174f-4150-90997817 a9e28f8b/DataProtectionBill (click PDF and HTML downloads; select "Data
Protection Bill [Lords] (Fourth sitting)).
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